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Court-System Transparency
Lynn M. LoPucki*
ABSTRACT: Over the past decade, the federal courts became the world's
most transparent court system by switchingfrom paper to electronicfiling,
resolving daunting privacy problems, and posting their case files on the
Internet. Now they are embarking on a second, equally important
transformation-theuse of relationalforms from which court data can be
extracted automatically. This Article describes the technology and seeks to
project and evaluate the effects of that second transformation.
If it occurs, the second transformation would create millions of windows
into the courts at virtually no cost to the government. Policymakers,
litigants,and the public would be able to see and understand the patternsof
judicial decisionmaking-who wins what and how often. That would
provide policy makers the feedback needed to fine tune the system, lawyers the
ability to predict the outcomes of their cases, and the public the ability to see
what courts actually do. All could also see whether the precautionsthey take
for supposed legal reasons are the right ones.
Opponents argue that court-record transparency (1) would expose parties
and witnesses to the risk of identity theft and other harms, (2) would invade
privacy by making previously-difficult-to-obtain public-record information
about individuals readily available, and (3) would pressurejudges in ways
that deprive them ofjudicial independence. This Article argues that none of
those objections is well-founded.
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COURT-SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Computer algorithms capable of predicting the outcomes of legal
disputes may soon be a reality. These algorithms would base their
predictions not on legal analysis of statutes, regulations, and court
opinions, 1 but on statistical analysis of case outcomes. Because the
algorithms do not yet exist, the case characteristics from which they would
make their predictions remain largely a mystery.
2
The characteristics would certainly include the identities of the judge
3
and the lawyers in a particular case. Those two pieces of information alone
would make the algorithms highly provocative, because neither is supposed
to play any role at all in case outcomes. Through the lens of such algorithms,
observers would see the courts as they actually operate, instead of as they are
supposed to operate.
Court transparency requires such algorithms. A court system is
"transparent" for the purposes of this Article when all relevant aspects of its
operation are revealed to policymakers, litigants, and the public in forms
that they can readily comprehend. For reasons that this Article explains,

1.
The sad history of efforts to devise computer algorithms capable of predicting case
outcomes based on analysis of issues and factors in legal opinions is summarized in Kevin D.
Ashley & Stefanie Bruninghaus, Computer Models for Legal Prediction, 46JURIMETRICSJ. 309, 31126 (2006).
2.
See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Welfare State and Mass Justice:A Warningfrom the Social
Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681, 717 (finding a "striking and disturbing" disparity
in the rates at which social-security-disability hearing examiners reversed awards); Lynn M.
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy ReorganizationsFailing?,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1939-45 (2002) (finding that large, public companies that were
reorganized in the Delaware and New York bankruptcy courts from 1991 to 1996 failed at
several times the rate of companies reorganized in all other courts, despite the lack of any
apparent differences in the companies choosing those courts); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew 1.
Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 295, 332 (2007) (finding that the levels at which particular asylum officers grant asylum
frequently differ from the office averages by more than fifty percent); Paul Elias & Rinat Fried,
A Failureto Execute, RECORDER (Cal.), Dec. 15, 1999, at I (finding huge variations from judge to
judge in the lengths and dispositions of death-penalty cases); Tom Chang and Antoinette
Schoar, Judge Specific Differences in Chapter 11 and Firm Outcomes (2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3590
(5000-case empirical study
documenting the existence of persistently pro-debtor and pro-creditor judges in business
bankruptcies).
3.
See, e.g., David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment to InvestigateAttorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2007) ("[A] veteran public
defender with ten years of experience reduces the average length of incarceration by 17
percent relative to a public defender in her first year."); Catherine T. Harris et al., Who Are Those
Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs' Attorneys, 58 SMU L. REV. 225
passim (2005) (finding large differences in medical-malpractice-litigation outcomes based on
attorney experience); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1487 (2008) (finding that the
U.S. Supreme Court "grants the petitions filed by the expert members of the Bar at a
significantly higher rate, and they also prevail on the merits more frequently").
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court systems can become transparent only when court files are maintained
in relational electronic formats and the public has free, technologically
unfettered access to their contents. Relational formats are the familiar
formats used in data-management and spreadsheet programs. Each piece of
data is tagged as the value of a characteristic of an object. Empiricists refer
to relational data as "coded." Statistics programs can process such data into
statistics, tables, and graphs.
The federal courts-which already maintain court files in electronic
format and make them available over the Internet-are on the brink of
introducing relationally formatted forms. Users of these forms "code" the
data as they create it, by entering it into fields (boxes) in specified formatsessentially the way customers fill out order forms on the Internet. The
Judicial Conference of the United States (the 'Judicial Conference"), the
regulator of the federal courts, has approved a data-enabled PDF format for
use, and the United States Trustee, a division of the Justice Department, has
recommended to software vendors that they begin using it for nineteen
4
documents commonly filed in bankruptcy cases.
The federal courts are not introducing relationally formatted forms
merely to achieve transparency. Indeed, transparency may not even be
among the courts' objectives. Data-enabled forms would improve court
administration by facilitating its automation. Once the technology is in
place, however, the courts will be transparent unless regulators erect or
maintain barriers to prevent public use. So far, the Judicial Conference has
permitted a steady but cautious advance toward transparency.
This Article takes as its starting point the current state of the world's
most transparent court system-the United States Courts as accessible
through Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER"). 5 Part II
describes the physical changes necessary for that system to achieve
transparency.
The remaining Parts then use systems-strategic analysis 6 to project the
consequences. Part III explores the benefits of transparency. Transparency
would expose and reduce corruption. It would expand the power of citizens

4.

U.S. Tr. Program, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Data Enabled Form Standard, http://www.

usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/defs/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (showing nineteen dataenabled bankruptcy forms qualified for use under the standard).
5. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records-From Documents to Data,
Particularsto Patterns 15 (Cornell Law Sch., Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-003,
2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1107412 ("Due to a cluster of mutually reinforcing
factors, state court systems have been far slower and less coordinated in making [the transition
from paper to electronic media].").
6. For an explanation of the systems/strategic analysis of law-related systems, see Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479 passim (1997) (explaining the
systems approach); Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lauyers'Heads,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1498, 1545-49 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, Legal Culture] (explaining

strategic analysis).
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and legislators over the courts and make the actual rules that govern society
visible to the public. Transparency would promote the settlement of the
most predictable cases and improve overall efficiency by focusing the
system's resources on the least predictable cases. Transparency would
reduce or prevent many kinds of lawyer malpractice and litigant error.
Part IV examines and refutes the arguments generally raised in
opposition to court-system transparency. The costs of transparency to the
public would be minimal, because academic institutions, nongovernmental
organizations, individuals, and the private sector would fund and do the
cheap, relatively simple data processing required. On careful examination,
the variety of privacy-based arguments generally raised in opposition to
transparency all fail-principally because the records to be made
transparent are already public and widely available. Transparency would
enhance rather than impairjudicial independence because it would provide
a sounder basis for the public's evaluation of judicial performance.
Transparency would enable widespread copying of legal documents. But
that too turns out to be a benefit rather than a detriment when analyzed in
terms of system function. This Article concludes in Part V that the effects of
court-system transparency would be overwhelmingly positive.
The analysis proceeds on two assumptions. First, the government
chooses to release all recorded court-system data except those sealed by
court order or redacted pursuant to recently adopted federal privacy
standards. Second, the government provides only the present level of
funding for data analysis. In accord with the systems-strategic method, the
analysis then projects the consequences by taking the perspectives of various
court-system participants, imagining the strategies that each would pursue in
response to the data release, and speculating on the interaction among
those strategies.
II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

This Part briefly describes the current system for access to federal case
files, the preconditions to transparency, and the mechanisms by which
courts would achieve transparency. It describes some issues that would arise
in removing the limitations that now prevent transparency and the effects of
removing those limitations.
A.

THE MECHANISMS OF TRANSPARENCY

PACER is a system operated by the federal courts. Since about 1997,
PACER has made federal-court case files, including the dockets, publicly
available over the Internet. 7 A case file generally includes all documents

7. Pub. Access to Court Elec. Records, Overview, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/
pacerdesc.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (providing an overview of and links into the PACER
system).
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filed with the clerk of the court by the parties or the judge in connection
with a case. 8 The "docket" for a case is a list of all documents contained in
the case file. Prior to PACER, the public could access case files only by
traveling to the courthouse, ordering records by mail, or buying copies from
service-company intermediaries. 9 With only minor exceptions, PACER now
makes district-court and bankruptcy-court case files-including hearing
transcripts-publicly available over the Internet. A pilot project is underway
to include digital audio recordings of hearings. 10 The dockets are in HTML
format; the documents are in PDF format.
PACER users must register online and pay eight cents per page to view
or download each document, up to a maximum single-document charge of
$2.40.11 In addition, PACER's report function provides a limited ability to
search for cases nationwide (by party or, in the district court, by nature of
case) or in a specific court (by several criteria).12
For a court system to be transparent, up-to-date research must be
available to answer millions of questions regarding the patterns of cases and
case outcomes. Already hundreds, if not thousands, of researchers use data
extracted from PACER. The work is labor intensive. A researcher can
sometimes use PACER's report function to identify a group of cases for
study, but more often researchers must identify the cases from outside
sources. The researcher must select and download the documents (and
incur costs) before the researcher can word-search them. Many PACER
documents cannot be word-searched at all, because the documents are
scanned rather than text-based PDFs, and the scans are of insufficient

8.

"Case file" is used as a term of art:
The term "case file" (whether electronic or paper) means the collection of
documents officially filed by the litigants or the court in the context of litigation,
the docket entries that catalog such filings, and transcripts ofjudicial proceedings.
The case file generally does not include several other types of information,
including non-filed discovery material, trial exhibits that have not been admitted
into evidence, drafts or notes by judges or court staff, and various documents that
are sometimes known as "left-side" file material. Sealed material, although part of
the case file, is accessible only by court order.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., REPORT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES A-4 (2001) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PRIVACY
REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/att81501.pdf.
9.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Research Access to Federal Court Data, 80 TEX. L. REV.
2161, 2166-67 (2002) (describing how scholars accessed court files before PACER).
10.
Pilot Project Will Post DigitalAudio Recordings Online, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), June 2007, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/200706/pilot/index.html.
11.

Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, CM/ECF Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.

psc.uscourts.gov/cmecf/ecffaq.html#GE5 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
12. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, CM/ECF Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.
psc.uscourts.gov/cmecf/ecffaq.html#CR16 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (describing the use of
the report function).
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quality to rescan them to text. Researchers typically print hard copies, mark
the data to be extracted, and convert the data to relational form by coding
and entering them into spreadsheets or databases by hand. The researchers
then analyze the data statistically and present them in tables, graphs, and
journal articles. Probably no more than a few hundred studies to date used
PACER, and only a handful of those are kept up-to-date.
Researchers would be able to generate and maintain millions of studies
only if they could entirely automate the processes of data extraction and
analysis. The required automation includes four processes.
First, a researcher must be able to conduct a word search of the entire
court system to identify cases for study. What prevents such a search today is
that (1) many of the PDF forms are scanned rather than text-based and thus
not readily word-searchable, and (2) the researcher must pay for each
document before searching it. The solution to the first problem is requiring
future filings to be in machine-readable text formats. The solution to the
second is ending user financing of PACER. If PACER documents were
available for download without charge, users could download and search the
entire court system or just the part that was of interest. PACER could also
support online word searches of the entire system.
Second, the researcher must be able to download the relevant
documents automatically. Automated Access to Court Electronic Records
("AACER") and Bloomberg are both private firms that identify relevant
PACER documents by case and docket searches, and download millions of
them for paying clients. 13 Those firms' existence demonstrates that
automatic downloads are feasible even without improvements in PACER.
Identification of the documents to be downloaded is the problem, and the
system-wide word search is the likely solution.
Third, the researcher must be able to move data from downloaded
documents into spreadsheets, data-management programs, and statistics
programs automatically. Researchers cannot do that today because court
documents do not provide the information in sufficiently regular forms and
formats. The solution is to require those who create the information
(principally lawyers and judges) to create it in sufficiently regular forms and
formats. Fortunately, the demands of automated case management are
already driving the courts in this direction. 14 The Judicial Conference has

13. AACER: Automated Access to Court Electronic Records, http://www.aacer.com (last
visited Sept. 23, 2008) (describing AACER); Bloomberg Home Page, http//ww.bloomberg.
com (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (follow "Log In/Register" hyperlink for subscription
information).
14. Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines:Justice Information Systems and the Question of
PublicAccess to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REv. 175, 198 (2004) (noting that courts
are already integrating their case-management information systems with electronic-docket and
document-management systems, which gives them the ability to grant public access without
additional development costs).
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authorized and may soon require the use of data-enabled PDF forms for
nineteen of the most commonly filed documents in bankruptcy cases. 15 The
lawyer or judge who completes a data-enabled PDF form answers specific
questions by checking boxes or filling in blanks. For example, a judge
entering a judgment might check a box indicating it to be a money
judgment, enter the dollar amount in response to one prompt, fill in the
date from which interest would accrue in response to a second, and state the
rate at which interest would accrue in response to a third. If the judgment is
for an injunction, the judge might select, from a menu of choices, standard
language identifying the acts to be enjoined, or might enter the judge's own
customized language. The data would be stored in fields. The Adobe
Acrobat program is already capable of automatically transferring the data
16
from data-enabled forms into Excel spreadsheets.
Fourth, the researcher must be able automatically to compile, display,
and statistically analyze the data. Software already exists for performing
these tasks.
After full implementation of these changes, researchers would still have
to design studies and program their implementation. But once a particular
study was up and running, the process of updating that study would be
trivial. For most studies, the researchers would not need outside funding
and so would not need to make grant applications. Each researcher would
be able to do many times the number of studies that a researcher can do
today. Studies that produced useful views of the system would be
automatically updated and thus always current. Some researchers might hide
their work as "proprietary" or make it available only for a fee. The current
pattern, however, is for researchers to post their data and findings to the
Internet and make them available without charge. Users would find both the
fee and free sites through search engines such as Google.
B. REMOVAL OF THE BARRIERS TO TRANSPARENCY
The federal courts would need to make three changes to achieve
transparency: (1) eliminate user fees, (2) specify and require relational
forms for common documents, and (3) disclaim present and future
restrictions on data retransfer.
Elimination of PACER fees would cost the federal government its
current PACER revenue stream of about $60 million a year. 17 Requiring the
use of relational forms would require the government to design those forms.
The form-design project could advance form by form and might take many
15.

See U.S. Tr. Program, supra note 4 (explaining data-enabled forms and providing links

to the nineteen forms).

16. Acrobat Professional 7.0 and 8.0 support data-enabled forms. In 7.0, users select
"Forms" and then "Create spreadsheet from data files."
17.

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2006, at 25

(2006) (stating that PACER revenues were $58 million in 2006).
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years to complete. If so, the court system would only gradually become
transparent.
The government currently imposes only one restriction on data
transfer-researchers working under PACER fee exemptions cannot
retransfer data. If the government eliminated user fees, researchers would
no longer obtain exemptions and the restriction would be irrelevant.
Researchers contemplating substantial investments in programming projects
might, however, still be concerned that the government would later impose
restrictions. Those researchers might need assurances that the government
18
would not.
A decision to remove the limits on transparency, without more, would
leave three political issues unresolved. The first would be the extent to which
19
privacy and commercial secrecy claims should limit court transparency.
The second remaining issue would be the extent to which the system
should require litigants to furnish, for transparency purposes, information
beyond what courts need to process cases or administer the court system.
Federal courts already require litigants to furnish some data "for statistical
20
purposes." Despite serious problems with the accuracy of those data,
some-particularly the case classifications and outcomes-have proven to be
valuable in research. Requiring litigants to furnish demographic data such as
gender, age, marital status, or educational level would add to the power of
the data.
As a practical matter, the courts are unlikely to require any additional
information at all. Doing so would burden the right to litigate by adding
expense and forcing litigants to disclose otherwise private information. Nor
is additional information needed. Provided that the courts do not also deidentify the case files, researchers would be able to link the court files to
outside sources of such information and thus supplement the case file
21
data.
The third issue-actually thousands of issues-would be the design of
the forms that would elicit relational data from system participants. The
precise questions and prompts included on the forms would determine the
form of the resulting data and ultimately what studies will be possible.
Researchers may be able to overcome some kinds of shortcomings in the
data by reformatting them. Reformatting, however, would always be difficult
and expensive, and sometimes it would be impossible. For all practical
purposes, the formats in which parties, judges, and others would submit
relational data, or the formats to which those data could automatically be
converted, would be the formats in which they would be used.

18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part IV.B.3.d (discussing proposals for restrictions on data use).
Part IV.B addresses this issue.
See infra note 130 and accompanying text (describing some of those problems).
See infra Part IV.B (discussing de-identification and its effects).
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Some questions and prompts would clearly be superior to others.
Prompts requiring more specificity in the data-without requiring so much
that litigants cannot reliably provide it-would maximize transparency. To
illustrate, prompting a litigant to indicate the litigant's "street address"
would provide more transparency than prompting the litigant to indicate its
"address." Responses to the latter prompt would include post-office boxes,
leaving some debtors' geographical locations unspecified. Similarly, asking
for the dollar amount in controversy would provide more transparency than
22
asking within which of several ranges the amount in controversy falls.
Researchers can easily categorize the data themselves if they want ranges.
Requiring the "market value of assets" or the "book value of assets," rather
than the "value of assets," would also increase the utility of the information
furnished.
Specificity comes at a cost. The forms that litigants must file become
longer and more difficult to complete. At some point, the more specific
prompts confuse litigants and elicit incorrect answers. Some
experimentation may be necessary to establish ideal levels.
By their choices, the form drafters will determine the questions that
researchers ultimately can and cannot answer. The long-running controversy
over the number of business bankruptcies illustrates the problem. 23 One
might consider a bankruptcy to be a "business" bankruptcy (1) only if the
debtor is currently engaged in business; (2) if the debtor is no longer in
business, but the business caused the bankruptcy; (3) if the debtor is no
longer in business, but the business contributed to the bankruptcy; or (4) if
the debtor was never in business, but the bankruptcy resulted from the
debtor's guarantee of the debtor's corporation's debts. The current system
leaves the choice among these definitions to each person entering data. The
resulting data are useless. To generate useful data, a transparent court
system would have to choose among the four definitions. To require debtors
to categorize their cases by all four standards would be unreasonably
burdensome.
The choice is political because it determines how many bankruptcies
will be categorized as "business." That matters because commentators
associate business bankruptcies with the politically positive image of

22. The petition form currently used in bankruptcy cases requires the debtor to provide
"estimated" numbers of creditors, assets, and debts by choosing one of several ranges for each.
U.S. Bankr. Court, Official Form 1, Voluntary Petition, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/BKForms_08_Official/B_001_0108f.pdf. Users of this data are stuck with the categories
chosen by the government. If the petition form asked for the numbers of creditors, assets, and
debts-allowing the debtor to furnish an estimated number if the debtor did not know the
precise number-users could construct whatever categories they preferred.

23. E.g., Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business
Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 757-64 (2005) (describing the history of Administrative Office
problems in counting business bankruptcies).
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entrepreneurial risk taking, while they associate consumer bankruptcies with
the negative image of profligate spending.
Officials who work in the court system would be tempted to promote
analyses that put them in a good light and to discourage those that would do
the opposite. They could accomplish that by manipulating court
information processing at its root-the relational formats in which litigants
furnish it. To prevent that from occurring, officials from outside the system,
academic researchers, and the public should participate in determining the
relational formats.
C.

THE.EFFECTS OFREMOVAL

As previously noted, removing the limits on transparency would cost the
government $60 million per year in PACER revenues, plus the cost of
developing and promulgating new, relational forms. Some or all of the costs
in the latter category would be incurred even absent public transparency
and, to that extent, should not count as transparency costs. Standardized,
data-enabled PDF forms would reduce the costs of court administration by
rendering court-file data transparent to judges and court administrators.
That is not part of transparency as defined for the purpose of this Article.
That work would go forward even if the courts did not intend to make court
files transparent to the public. In fact, courts currently may be pursuing
public transparency only as a means of financing internal transparency.
The government would incur no other costs. The private vendors of
litigation-support software and their customers would bear the cost of
implementing the new forms. This Article assumes that the government
neither conducts nor funds any of the data processing and analysis that
would render the court system transparent to the public.
Once relational data were available cost-free, both the public and
private sectors would devote substantial resources to process them into
usable forms.2 4 Hundreds of U.S. law-school researchers are already engaged
in the collection and analysis of court-system data.2 5 Their numbers would
multiply in the new, data-rich environment.

24.

NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 933-34 (1997),

[hereinafter NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/
report/21bdata.pdf (predicting that an in-bulk release of bankruptcy data would lead to
extensive processing at nongovernment expense); id. at 926 (predicting that the effect would be
to "aid in the development of bankruptcy policy, the allocation of bankruptcy resources, and
formulation of bankruptcy legislation").
25. For example, scholars submitted more than 300 papers presenting the results of
empirical studies to the Second Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies. E-mail from
Jennifer Arlen, Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law, NYU Sch. of Law, to Lynn M. LoPucki,
Security Pac. Bank Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 12, 2007, 2:05 p.m. PST) (on file
with author). Courses and seminars in which students design and execute empirical studies of
the legal system are now common. A group of scholars at the University of Illinois College of
Law is preparing a set of teaching materials for those courses and seminars. See generally Robert
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The history of securities and stock-price disclosures supports the idea
that bulk data release induces privately funded data processing. U.S.
securities laws require extensive disclosure of company information in highly
structured, but not strictly relational, formats. Standard & Poor's converts
that structured text into relational data and sells access to it through the
Compustat database 26 and a second-generation product called "Capital
IQ."27 The University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business has done
much the same thing with stock prices. 28 Today, thousands of businessschool faculty members devote substantial portions of their working days to
analyzing data from Capital IQ the Center for Research in Securities Prices
("CRSP"), and hundreds of related proprietary databases, and publishing
their findings in scholarly journals. The operation of public companies and
the pricing of their securities are not yet fully transparent, but that may be
only because Capital IQ and CRSP charge for their data and prohibit retransfer. Websites that automatically convert stock-price data into user29
adjustable tables and charts are ubiquitous.
The single set of data released from a transparent court system would
be applied to answer a potentially infinite number of questions. As a result,
numerous processing paths would flow from that single source. Those paths
would have to be easy to create and modify, and capable of linking court
data to data from other sources.
This need for flexibility suggests that the subsystems would be modular.
That is, subsystems would arise to process particular kinds of data through
particular stages for particular purposes. For example, one subsystem might
specialize in converting non-relational, text-based data from the district
courts into relational data. Another might link relational court data to
census data. A third might specialize in providing journalists with a window
on state and federal Freedom of Information Act cases.
The Bankruptcy Research Database ("BRD") illustrates this modular
approach. 30 Through the BRD, I specialize in converting structured text

M. Lawless, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Thomas S. Ulen, Empirical Methods in Law (2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review).
26. Univ. of Pa., Wharton Sch., Databases in WRDS, http://wrds.wharton.upenn.
edu/demo/databaselist.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (describing various business databases,
including Compustat).
27. Capital IQ Implementation-Data Feeds, https://www.capitaliq.com/main/data
feeds.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
28.
Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, History, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/about/history.
html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (describing how the Center for Research in Securities Prices

("CRSP") database developed).
29.
See, e.g., Tradingcharts.com, Stock Price Charts, http://stocks.tradingcharts.com/
stocks/charts/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (offering free, customized stock-price charts).

30.

One version of the database is available online. Bankr. Research Database, Web BRD:

A Window on the World of Big-Case Bankruptcy, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (last visited Jan.
27, 2009).
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from PACER and Securities and Exchange Commission filings into
relational data for the set of all large public-company bankruptcies. 31 With
the help of AACER, I monitor the cases to their ultimate dispositions. I make
data relational by collecting each field according to BRD protocols and
exercising the judgment sometimes necessary to do that. The BRD contains
fields for linking BRD data to other business databases and for linking BRD
32
data to PACER.
I make the complete BRD available free to legal scholars in Excel
spreadsheet form. The scholars combine it with data from other sources,
sometimes including data that they obtain from Capital IQ or directly from
PACER, and use it to answer questions of interest to them. Professor Janis
Sarra of the University of British Columbia is constructing a database of
Canadian public-company bankruptcies that she designed to work with the
BRD to facilitate cross-border comparisons.
The maintenance of databases like the BRD is increasingly common.
Professor Elizabeth Warren's Consumer Bankruptcy Project combines
PACER data with survey data to provide the basis for numerous research
projects by independent scholars.3 3 The Stanford Securities Litigation
Clearinghouse collects documents from state- and federal-court files in
34
securities class-action litigation and makes them available for free online.
Professor Margo Schlanger maintains a similar database with respect to civil35
rights litigation.
Networks of these kinds of projects can serve as the foundations for a
fully transparent court system. Today, these projects are labor intensive and
hence limited in scope. In full transparency, they would be tied seamlessly
together and the resulting system would process data automatically from
court files to user displays.
Once the technology necessary to achieve transparency was in place and
visible, it would pose a purely political issue. Should transparency's
tremendous power be unleashed? The remainder of this Article assumes that
the federal courts (1) eliminate all PACER user fees; (2) promulgate
standardized, data-enabled PDF forms for all types of litigation and require
lawyers and judges to use them; (3) continue to post the publicly available
portions of case files to the Internet; and (4) impose no new barriers to
31.
Compustat's conversion of the SEC data is inadequate because Compustat coverage
excludes many large, public-company bankruptcies.
32.
The link to Compustat is by the Standard & Poor's company identifier, GVKEY. The
link to PACER is by court district and case number for the "lead" case in each corporate group.
33.
The project is described generally in Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class
Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 115 n.* (2003) (describing the
Consumer Bankruptcy Project).
34. Stanford Law Sch., Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.
stanford.edu (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
35.
Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, http://clearing
house.wustl.edu (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
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downloading or using the data. Based on those assumptions, the next two
Parts seek to project and evaluate the consequences.
III. TRANSPARENCY'S BENEFITS

Transparency would provide an array of benefits. They include
exposing and reducing corruption and impropriety, enhancing legislative
control over the courts, apprising the public of the real rules by which they
are governed, enabling lawyers and parties to predict the outcomes of their
cases, providing a substantial new source of general knowledge, reducing
legal malpractice, and increasing court-system efficiency.
A.

ExPOsURE AND REDUCTION OF CORRuPTON

Government transparency is widely recognized as a deterrent to
corruption.3 6 The theory seems to be that if the government records and
makes public its transactions, (1) the public is more likely to discover
corrupt transactions and (2) the threat of discovery deters corrupt
transactions. Discovery of a corrupt transaction is more likely in a
transparent system, because the record is permanently available. Any
member of the public can discover and report the transaction's corrupt
nature to the government or the media.
A single agent-no matter how diligent or trustworthy-could not
substitute for the public in this role. The corrupt nature of some
transactions is apparent only to observers with other, privately held,
information. For example, court records might show an otherwise
unobjectionable decision by Judge X in favor of Party Y.Only a few members
of the public might know that Party Ydoes business with Z, a relative or close

36. E.g., NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 360 n.28 (Cal.
1999). The court noted:
[T]he public has a legitimate interest in access to . . . court documents .... If
public court business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose
corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism. For this reason
traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence distrusts secrecy in judicial proceedings
and favors a policy of maximum public access to proceedings and records of
judicial tribunals.
Id.; Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1933)
("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."); Ronald D. Lunau et
al., The Federal Accountability Act: Changes to Procurement and Contracting in Canada, 42
PROCUREMENT L. 5, 6 (2007) ("The basic philosophy underlying the [Canadian Financial
Administration Act] is that transparency will reduce government corruption."). Transparency
International is an organization devoted to fighting corruption by making systems transparent.
E.g., TRANSPARENCY INT'L, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 2008-2010, at 7 (2007), available at http://
www.transparency.org/about-lns/strategy_2010 (follow "Transparency International Strategic
Framework 2008-2010" hyperlink) ("Throughout our efforts to develop research and tools, our
aim is to build and strengthen integrity systems, providing long-term improvement in
transparency and accountability for societies.").
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associate of Judge X In a court system policed by the public, Judge X would
be wise to recuse him or herself from the case, because Judge X could have
no assurance that the relationship would not come to light. In a court system
policed by a single agent, Judge X might feel free to decide the case
corruptly, because the agent would be unlikely to know of the relationship
37
between Judge Xand Party Y.
Even when the evidence is inadequate to demonstrate corruption in any
particular case, the evidence may be adequate to demonstrate corruption
within a group of cases. The latter kind of evidence consists of patterns in
outcomes that are unlikely to occur in the absence of corruption. Examples
of such patterns include (1) patterns in the significant digits of particular
numbers on tax returns that do not conform to Benford's Law; 38 (2)
patterns in Sumo-wrestling match outcomes in which wrestlers badly
needing particular wins get them and then lose the following matches to the
same opponents;3 9 and (3) patterns in standardized-test results that plausibly
40
could only be generated by test-administrator cheating.
Researchers can apply such methods to judicial decisionmaking. In The
Super Crunchers, Professor Ian Ayres points out that the random assignment
of cases to the judges of a given court sets up a natural experiment. 41 In such
a system, judge-to-judge differences in outcomes must be attributable to one
of two causes: the judges themselves or random differences in the cases
assigned to the judges. Statistical methods can calculate the likelihood that a
given judge-to-judge difference in case outcomes occurred randomly and
thus the likelihood that it resulted from differences in the judges.
Not all judge-specific differences result from corruption. But once the
statisticians have identified particular differences in outcomes as judgespecific, focused regulators can more easily find the evidence needed to
prove particular outcomes to be corrupt.
B.

ENHANCEMENT OFLEGISLATIVE COrROL OVER THE COURTS

The United States has a republican form of government. Citizens elect
representatives to legislatures. Those legislatures make the laws. Courts also
make law, but they are supposed to do so only in situations where the

37. Ex parte Capital U-Drive-It, Inc., 630 S.E.2d 464, 469 (S.C. 2006) ("Public access
discourages perjury and encourages bringing the truth to light because participants are less
likely to testify falsely in a sunlit courtroom before their neighbors than in a private room
before court officials.").
38. Theodore P. Hill, The Difficulty of Faking Data, 12 CHANCE 27, 31 (1999) ("Nigrini had
substantial evidence that in most fabricated tax data, however, the significant digits are not close
to Benford, and his article describes a goodness-of-fit-to-Benford test to help identify fraudulent
financial data.").
39.
STEVEN D. LEVITr & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 40-45 (2005).

40.
41.

Id. at 25-38.
IAN AYRES, THE SUPER CRUNCHERS 71-72 (2007).
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legislatures have not manifested the public will. When legislation, in the
form of a constitution or a statute, conflicts with judge-made law, the system
requires the judges to yield. As Professor Todd Peterson put it:
Congress ...

has the power to define the substantive law that the

courts apply in the cases that come before them. Congress may not,
of course, overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution, unless it amends the Constitution through the
process specified in Article V. With respect to all other law,
however, Congress has the final say. If the Congress disagrees with
a Supreme Court decision on the scope of a common-law issue,
Congress may enact a statute to reverse the effect of the decision.
In the same way, if Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of a statute, it may amend the statute to overrule the
Court's interpretation, even if it does so with respect to a specific
case that is still pending in the courts. About the only limitation on
Congress's power over substantive law is that it may not change the
result in a particular case once the Court has issued a final decree
42
in that case.
The same is true with respect to the interpretation of a statute. Assuming
that a statute is constitutional, the job of the courts is to vindicate the
statutory scheme enacted by the legislature. Pure textualists think that
judges should be bound by the precise language of the statutes before them,
while more nuanced interpretivists think that judges should seek to
implement the legislature intent. Both, however, agree that the courts are
43
not free to ignore statutes.
Despite this theory, legislatures often find it difficult to control the
courts, especially when the nature of the legislative policy requires the
delegation of discretion to the courts. Particular judges may be hostile to a
given policy and deliberately make decisions that frustrate it. Other judges
may not understand the policy, yielding the same outcome. As a result,
judges often fail to implement the legislature's policies.
Court-system transparency could show legislatures and the public how
the courts implement laws. If Congress made changes in the bankruptcy
system designed to increase creditors' recoveries, Congress would know
whether creditors' recoveries increased. If it made changes intended to
reduce the rate of recidivism by sex offenders, it would know the extent to
which recidivism decreased. 44 This feedback would alert the legislatures to

42.
(2004).
43.
(1999).

Todd David Peterson, CongressionalInvestigations of FederalJudges, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36
Pamela S. Karlen, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 544

44.
Such information is not available today. The government published its only report on
sex-offender recidivism in 2003. That report examined sex offenders released in 1994 and
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change statutory language when necessary to specify the legislators'
intentions more clearly. The process would be benign because it would
occur in full public view.
Feedback would also assist judges in their efforts to faithfully implement
laws and policies. For example, the Bankruptcy Code requires judges to find,
as a pre-condition to chapter 11 plan confirmation, that "[c] onfirmation of
the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor ...."-45 From 1991 through
1996, the Delaware bankruptcy judges made such a finding in each large
public-company bankruptcy. Those findings were systematically incorrect.
Within five years after confirmation, fifty-four percent of the reorganized
companies had filed a second bankruptcy or liquidated. 46 The judges
remained unaware of their failure for years after their decisions, because no
mechanism existed to identify the failure or bring it to their attention.
Court-system transparency would provide such a mechanism. Feedback
from researchers would enable individual judges to adjust their future
rulings to comply with statutes. In this example, the researchers could, in
addition to highlighting the judges' noncompliance, identify the subgroups
of judges or cases in which noncompliance was highest. The judges could
then give greater scrutiny to the cases in those subgroups, and by doing so,
achieve compliance.
C.

POPULARZATION OFTHE LAW

Law is often thought of merely as a mechanism for resolving disputes.
But an even more important function of law is to apprise citizens of the rules
that govern them. As every first-year law student learns, the law in its current
form-cases and statutes-does a poor job of that. The "rules" are not rules
at all, but merely vague, generalized standards. Those standards usually take
on concrete meaning only when the courts implement them in large
numbers of cases.
By revealing the patterns in those cases to the public, court-system
transparency would, for the first time, actually apprise citizens of the rules
that govern them. The information would reach the public though a series
of steps. For example, the first step might be regression analysis by a legal
academic on the body of cases challenging clickwrap agreements. That
analysis might discover the circumstances in which courts enforce particular

provided only three-year recidivism rates. Thus, the data were final more than five years before
the government released the report. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 5-6 (2003), availableat http://

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf (defining re-arrest and reconviction as occurring
within three years). The researchers did not attempt to evaluate any changes in law.
45.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1994).

46. LYNN M. LoPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 113 tbl.6 (2005).

FOR BIG CASES IS
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contract terms and the statistical likelihood of such enforcement. In a
second step, the analyst might publish conclusions in an academic journal,
provide them to the media, display them on a website, or embed them in
software to make them easily available to users when needed. The
information would enable users to more intelligently decide whether or in
what circumstances to enter into click-wrap agreements.
If, for example, the data showed that that courts generally enforce
oppressive clickwrap agreements, users might be reluctant to sign them but
still lack practical alternatives. If that were the case, however, consumer
advocates could press for a change in the law. With data, the advocates
would be more likely to succeed. They could prove that a problem exists.
Members of the public would be aware of the problem and could join in
requesting a solution.
The revelations of a transparent court system would not be completely
unbiased. Researchers may have their own agendas. But in a system that
made research easy, researchers would compete for public attention by
seeking to establish credibility. Researchers would do that by making both
their data and data processing transparent. Users want accurate, unbiased
views. In open, transparent contests between more and less accurate views,
the more accurate views generally would prevail.

D. PREDICTIONOFLITIGATION OuTcoMEs
The practice of law consists principally of advising, planning, and
litigating. Each of these three activities requires lawyers to predict what
courts will do. The centrality of prediction in the legal process is captured in
Oliver Wendell Holmes's definition of law. Over a century ago, he wrote that
"[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
47
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
Holmes advocated an essentially empirical approach to predicting legal
outcomes. 48 The data sources he contemplated-court opinions, statutes,
regulations, and commentary-continue to dominate legal prediction. 49 In

47. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
48. Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The Predictive Theory of Law as an
Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 329, 335-42 (1994) (arguing that Holmes's
conception of law is empirical); id. at 341 (stating that Holmes's conception "must be
recognized as an empirical theory of law").
49. Id. at 341. ("[Holmes's] case method begins with legal cases. They are the data that
must be explained."). Holmes himself wrote:
The means of the study are a body of reports, of treatises, and of statutes, in this
country and in England, extending back for six hundred years, and now increasing
annually by hundreds. In these sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered
prophecies of the past upon the cases in which the axe will fall. These are what
properly have been called the oracles of the law. Far the most important and pretty
nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of legal thought is to make these
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addition, lawyers rely heavily on their personal knowledge of judges and
opinion-less decisions, and on other lawyers' knowledge shared through
personal conversations, continuing-legal-education programs, and published
commentary.
With respect to court opinions, the processing method that Holmes
recommended still dominates. The lawyer finds and reads the opinions most
relevant to the case at hand, extracts a governing principle by inductive
reasoning, and then applies the principle deductively to the case at hand.
The result is the lawyer's prediction of what a court will do.
To the extent that opinions interpreting statutes, regulations, and
ordinances exist, the same method applies. To the extent that they do not
exist, the lawyer works from the statute's text. The lawyer reads the text,
determines whether the facts of the case at issue are within its scope, and if
so, the lawyer applies the statute deductively to reach a prediction.
1.

Can Lawyers Predict the Outcomes of Cases?

Lawyers often assume that their legal expertise equips them to predict
outcomes better than a computer program running mechanically
extractable relational data. For at least some kinds of legal problems,
however, data-based analysis can already outperform legal experts. A recent
50
experiment in predicting Supreme Court decisions illustrates the point.
The experiment pitted the aggregate predictions of eighty-three law
professors and appellate-attorney experts against a regression analysis that
required only six easily available pieces of data for each case: "(1) circuit of
origin; (2) issue area of the case; (3) type of petitioner (e.g., the United
States, an employer, etc.); (4) type of respondents; (5) ideological direction
(liberal or conservative) of the lower-court ruling; (6) whether the petitioner
argued that a law or practice is unconstitutional. '51 The experts accurately
predicted the Supreme Court's decision in only fifty-nine percent of the
sixty-seven cases; the regression analysis accurately predicted the Court's
52
decision in seventy-five percent of those cases.
Lawyers also assume that they can see the patterns in the cases they
litigate. In fact, their ability to do so is quite limited. The cases that a given
lawyer knows about are likely too small a number to exhibit the general
pattern. Even if the important patterns occur in the cases that the lawyer
knows about, those patterns may be too subtle to notice. For example, a
prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected
system.
Holmes, supranote 47, at 457.
50. Theodore Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to PredictingSupreme Court Decisionmaking,104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 passim (2004).
51. Id. at 1154 n.19.
52. Id. at 1150 ("The model predicted 75% of the Court's affirm/reverse results correctly,
while the experts collectively got 59.1% right.").
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prominent bankruptcy practitioner recently noted that "[i]t was once
believed that some insolvent enterprises would be difficult to sell for full
value," but claimed that "the size of the distressed business no longer
operates as a constraint on sale ...and ...

buyers have become less likely to

53
impose an 'insolvency' discount in connection with such a sale." Almost
simultaneously with that publication, Joseph Doherty and I released
empirical results showing that insolvent enterprises, on average, sold for
54
only half of what they would have been worth in reorganization.
The recent discovery of high refiling and failure rates among Delawarereorganized large, public companies provides a second example. By
historical accident, the law entitles bankrupt large, public companies to
choose their bankruptcy courts. 55 In the early 1990s, companies suddenly
began choosing the relatively inexperienced, one-judge court in
Wilmington, Delaware. The Delaware court's market share increased
steadily-from zero in the decade prior to 1990 to eighty-seven percent of all
large, public-company bankruptcies filed in the United States in 1996
(thirteen of fifteen cases).56 Bankruptcy professionals and academics lauded
the Delaware court as the most sophisticated in the nation, and other courts
57
began emulating its methods.
In March 2000, Sara Kalin added data on the ultimate fate of the
companies reorganized from 1990 through 1996 to the Bankruptcy Research
Database. Purely by accident ofjuxtaposition, we noticed that the companies
filing in Delaware and New York (the second most popular court) failed at
rates two to seven times as high as those filing in all other courts. 58 The
lawyers thought the Delaware and New York courts were doing the best job
of reorganizing companies when in fact they were doing the worst.59 The

53.

Donald S. Bernstein, U.S. Chapter 11 Today: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the

Courthouse, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CORPORATE RECOvERY AND

INSOLVENCY 2007, at 6 (2007). Bernstein was hardly the only one to misperceive the pattern.
Lynn M. LoPucki &Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2007)
(quoting leading bankruptcy academics to the same effect).
54. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 53, at 24.
55. LoPucKI, supra note 46, at 30-39 (describing the application of bankruptcy venue
rules).
56. Id. at 49-50.
57. Id. at 123-28.
58. For example, forty-two percent of the companies reorganized in the Delaware court
from 1991 to 1996 were back in bankruptcy within five years. The corresponding rate for
companies reorganized in the New York court was nineteen percent. The corresponding rate
for companies reorganized in all other courts was six percent.
59. Ayotte and Skeel have offered a spirited defense of the Delaware courts' poor
performance. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current
Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 passim (2006). We disagree. Lynn M.
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, DelawareBankruptcy: Failure in the Ascendency, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
1387 passim (2006). The point made here, however, does not depend on the resolution of that
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difference in the performances of the three sets of courts during that period
60
was statistically significant at the .001 level.
The discovery of this pattern did not require statistical analysis, but it
did require data. That is, the pattern was obvious if one looked at a list that
showed the name of the emerging company, the reorganization court, and
whether the company refiled. Nearly every refiler on the list was among the
minority of companies that had been reorganized in Delaware or New York.
The lawyers did not, however, have such a list. None noticed the pattern
until we announced our findings in June 2000.61 Lawyers may become so
absorbed in the specific case that even the most prominent pattern in case
outcomes can be invisible to them.
2.

Can Statistical Analysis Predict the Outcomes of Cases?

The social sciences employ a predictive method far more powerful than
a lawyer's intuition: regression analysis. The researcher who seeks to predict
a judicial decision begins by identifying past cases in which similar decisions
were made. The researcher forms a hypothesis regarding the identity of the
factors that determine the outcomes and collects data regarding the factors
and outcomes. The researcher then determines mathematically which
factors correlate most highly with the outcomes. Based on those
correlations, the researcher estimates a mathematical formula that
determines the odds of a particular outcome under any combination of
factor values.
The LoPucki-Doherty Professional Fees Calculator (the "Calculator")
illustrates the process concretely. Joseph Doherty and I conducted a study of
court-awarded professional fees in large, public-company bankruptcies.
Using the Bankruptcy Research Database, we identified a sample of 102
large, public-company bankruptcies. From the court files on PACER, we
collected the amounts of professional fees awarded and the values of several
case characteristics ("independent variables") that we thought might
determine the amounts of the fees and expenses (the "dependent variable").
Among the independent variables were several measures of the size of the
debtor, several measures of the complexity of the case, several measures of
the numbers of parties involved in the case, several measures of the duration
of the case, the identities of the professionals and judges, and some
characteristics of those professionals and judges.
Through a reiterative process-part computerized mathematics, part
human judgment-we determined from the data what we considered to be
the "best" predictive model for determining the total amount of professional
disagreement. Even if Ayotte and Skeel were right, the fact would remain that a distinct pattern
existed in the outcomes of the lawyers' cases; yet, the lawyers did not know about it.
60.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 2, at 1939-45.

61.
No reports of higher refiling or refailure rates in Delaware were made prior to the
release of the results of our studies.
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fees and expenses that a large, public company would incur in bankruptcy. A
regression model is essentially a binomial mathematical formula in which
one term is the value of an independent variable and the other-the
"coefficient"-indicates that variable's level of importance in predicting the
dependent variable. Here, the dependent variable is the amount of the
professional fees and expenses in a case. By way of illustration, this is one of
the models we estimated:
F= (A x 0.694) + (D x 0.161) + (Nx-0.091)
F= the log of the fees and expenses awarded to professionals in the
case in dollars
A = the log of the debtor's assets reported in dollars
D = whether the case is in the Delaware bankruptcy court,
expressed as "1" or "0"
N = whether the case is in the New York bankruptcy court,
expressed as "1" or "0"
The formula tells us that the log of fees and expenses is on average equal to
.694 times the log of the debtor's assets plus 0.161 if the case is in Delaware,
or minus 0.091 if the case is in New York. From the assets and the court
location, this formula predicts the fees and expenses.
What model-that is, formula-would predict fees and expenses "best"
is a matter of opinion. But the accuracy with which a given model predicts
them within a data set is a mathematically measurable fact. Add one more
assumption-that the relationship of the independent variables to the
dependent variable will be the same in future cases as in past cases-and
what you have is mathematical prediction of the law, that is, "what officials
62
do about disputes."
The model that we concluded was best in predicting professional fees
and expenses in large, public-company bankruptcies employs six variables:
(1) the debtor's assets as reported on the bankruptcy petition, (2) the
length of the case from filing to plan confirmation, (3) the number of
professional firms authorized to work in the case, (4) the year the case is
filed, (5) the number of people the debtor employed before filing, and (6)
whether the debtor forum-shops to a court away from its headquarters.
Employed in the mathematical combination indicated by our analysis, these
factors explained ninety-one percent of the case-to-case variance in fees and
expenses in the 102 cases we studied.
The last step in the prediction process was to provide our discovery to
the public in an easily usable form. The Calculator is a computer program
that accepts values for the independent variables in our model, plugs them

62. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1951) ("What these officials do about disputes is,
to my mind, the law itself").

COURT-SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY

into the mathematical formulas of our models, and returns the predicted
dollar amount of fees and expenses, along with the eighty percent
confidence levels for the prediction. 63 We posted the Calculator on a
64
website.
If the court system were transparent, models such as these would be
ubiquitous. Together, they would predict virtually every predictable aspect of
judicial decisionmaking.
Regression analysis not only identifies the factors that cause a given set
of outcomes, it also quantifies the relationship between the factors and the
outcomes. The quantification of predictions-in the form of "odds" or
chances-can be a crucial aid to legal planning.
65
A recent study of medical-malpractice recoveries illustrates the point.
Using court-file data, the researchers found that plaintiffs represented by
experienced lawyers were more likely to recover money than plaintiffs
represented by inexperienced lawyers. Anyone might have guessed that
without the need for a study. The importance of the study was in its
quantification of the effect. Plaintiffs with experienced lawyers facing
inexperienced defense lawyers recovered in eighty percent of their cases,
while plaintiffs with inexperienced lawyers facing experienced defense
66
lawyers recovered in less than forty percent of their cases.
A transparent court system would not offer an answer to every legal
question. Parties often settle cases and issues before resolution, and in most
instances, the courts do not require the parties to reveal the terms of
settlements. 67 A transparent court system would, however, provide far more
answers than the current system provides, because it would take into account
a far higher number of decisions and more relevant information about those
decisions.

63.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 386 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining "confidence interval" as "[a] statistical range with a specified probability that a given
parameter lies within the range"). As applied to our fee calculator, there is an eighty-percent
probability that the actual amount of fees and expenses for a case of the kind in the data set will
be within the eighty-percent confidence level.
64. Bankr. Research Database, The LoPucki-Doherty Professional Fees Calculator, http://
lopucki.law.ucla.edu/feecalculator.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
65.

Harris et al., supra note 3, passim.

66.

Id. at 243 tbl.6.

67.
E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th
Cir. 2003) ("'Secrecy of settlement terms ... is a well-established American litigation practice."'
(quoting In re Franklin Nat'l Bank, 92 F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981))); Scott A. Moss,
IlluminatingSecrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REv. 867, 869
(2007) ("Courts regularly allow confidentiality provisions; indeed, under existing law, they
cannot force parties to disclose settlement terms they had agreed to keep confidential.").
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The Inadequacy of Court Opinion Data

The courts' reported opinions are already freely available. Researchers
have done numerous regression analyses of case outcomes based on data
collected from them. 68 Reported opinions are, however, of limited use in
mathematically predicting outcomes. First, opinions are available for only a
small minority of decisions. 69 Because researchers have less data to work
with, analyses based on opinions are less probative than those based on
decisions. Second, opinions are notoriously nonrepresentative of all
decisions. 70 Third, opinion data are text-based. Researchers must convert
the data to relational format for statistical analysis. 71 That prevents
automated analysis-at least until judges begin issuing their opinions in
relational formats. It also means that variables of interest are often missing
from the opinions, rendering the data less powerful. 72 Fourth, a court
opinion is often a biased description of the decided case. The writer may be
unwilling to explain the real reasons for the decision or may even be
unaware of them.
Professor Frederick Schauer suggests that the variables that are the true
determinants of case outcomes might not even be disclosed in court
opinions.
[I]f we were to undertake a statistical analysis of "the law" in order
best to engage in the process of predicting future legal outcomes,
we would, in some form or other, look to identify the variables that
had the greatest predictive value. These variables might, as Holmes
suspects, be the variables of legal doctrinal categorization. But
whether the variables were in fact what Holmes suspected-and
desired-would be an empirical question, and it might turn out, as
68. David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800" Harassment
Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1275 (2001) (acknowledging that their study
from reported opinions "may or may not represent or closely resemble the entire legal
universe"); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 1036, 1046 (1991) ("These results are based on reported cases that may or may not be a
representative sample ....");
James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 823, 838 (1993) ("[Slurely not all of the opinions were reported, and I suspect
that my reported opinions are a small minority of the total.").
69. Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405,
1438 n.170 (2000) (providing statistics supporting the conclusion that "[iun the large majority
of their cases, American judges write neither opinions nor explanatory orders").
70. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal
Court System, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 539 (1989) ("Readers of published appellate opinions
perceive a high percentage of successful constitutional tort cases. Those tracking the outcome
of district court cases see a far different reality.").
71.
E.g., Thompson, supra note 68, at 1044-45 (describing the coding of veil-piercing
opinions).
72. Requiring courts to render opinions in relational formats could solve both these
problems. I am unaware of any effort to impose such a requirement.
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Llewellyn suspected to the contrary, that they were variables not
likely to be identified from the opinions of the courts that reached
73
those decisions.
The transparent court system responds to Schauer's concern by offering the
entire case record for analysis rather than just the court's opinion. Using the
entire record minimizes missing data and vastly multiplies the numbers of
cases and variables that might be used in predictions.
Even these vast multiplications do not necessarily allay Schauer's fears.
He continues:
But what if legal outcomes are not amenable to categorization?
Although the possibility that legal outcomes may be totally random
seems too remote to be taken seriously, it could still be the case
that no variable had any substantial amount of predictive power,
such that no single factor, and even no collection of factors, could
provide with any confidence a prediction of a future legal outcome.
Even the kind of empirical analysis that Llewellyn championed, and
even when that analysis was done with the best possible tools of
multiple regression, might simply yield the conclusion that no
identifiable variable yielded a useful correlation with decisional
74
outcomes.
Schauer acknowledges that the concern he raises is itself an empirical
question. The answer to that question is already partially in. At least some
kinds of legal outcomes are startlingly predictable. As previously mentioned,
a simple computerized algorithm outperformed constitutional-law experts in
predicting decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 75 In a study of punitive
damages, a group of researchers found that "unless the case involves an
intentional tort or a business-related tort (such as employment claims),
punitive damages will almost never be awarded." 76 In a study of 1600
bankruptcy-court case files, Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay
77
Westbrook did not find a single case in which the court denied discharge.
In a study of 101 death-penalty case files, two journalists found that the
78
identities of the judges explained the largest disparities in treatment.
Using a database of all federal trial and appeals, Kevin Clermont and
Theodore Eisenberg found that defendants were nearly three times as likely

73.

Frederick Schauer, Predictionand Particularity,78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 783-84 (1998).

74. Id. at 786.
75. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
76. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictabilityof Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623,
659 (1997).
77.
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE
OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCYAND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 265-66 n. 11 (1989).

78. Elias & Fried, supra note 2, passim (finding huge variations from judge to judge in the
length and disposition of death-penalty cases).
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as plaintiffs to obtain reversals on appeal. 79 This list could easily be
expanded80

4.

Prediction's Systemic Effects

Greater predictability of litigation outcomes would have important
impacts, not only on the court system, but on society as a whole. Some
scholars argue that court-system predictability promotes private-sector
economic planning and, ultimately, increases productivity. 81 Those engaged
in legal-planning activities of any kind would have sounder bases on which to
proceed. Doctors deciding whether to practice "defensive medicine" could
know the extent to which their efforts actually reduced liability risk.8 2 Parties
to clickwrap agreements 83 or liability releases8 4 could know the odds that
those agreements or releases would be effective. Persons hesitating to
become directors of corporations, to offer useful but risky products in the
marketplace, or to agree to seemingly draconian contract terms would be
able to quantify the liability threats that they would face. In short, those
wanting to plan for legal liability would be able to do so more effectively.
Greater predictability would also impact case processing. Judges seeking
to provide "horizontal equity" to litigants by deciding their cases consistently
with the decisions of other judges 5 would have the necessary data. They
could decide in accord with the predicted outcome.
Statistical analysis and data management would become important legal
skills. Predictability would facilitate settlement by reducing the differences in

79.
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts: Civil
Rights Really Do Differfrom Negotiable Instruments,2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 947.
80.
E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119 passim (2002) (surveying empirical studies of civil litigation).
81.
Peter Boettke & J. Robert Subrick, Rule of Law, Development, and Human Capabilities,10
Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 109, 111 (2002) ("[Tlhe rule of law provides us with the stability and
predictability in economic affairs required for agents to engage in entrepreneurial actionboth in terms of exploiting existing opportunities for profit through arbitrage and the discovery
of new profit opportunities through innovation."); Edward A. Morse, Rflections on the Rule of
Law and "Clear Reflection of Income'- What Constrains Discretion?,8 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 445,
457 n.52 (1999) ("Predictability may also increase productivity, to the extent that economic
commitments can be made in reliance upon a stable legal structure.").
82.
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence
for MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2002) (defining "defensive medicine" as "care
provided solely (or mostly) to reduce the probability of litigation").
83.
William J. Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online Contracts:Do Courts Consistently Enforce
Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433 passim (2003) (attempting to answer that
question based on reported opinions).
84.
Ryan S. Holcomb, The Validity and Effectiveness of Pre-Injuy Releases of Gross Negligence in
Texas, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 233 passim (1998) (attempting to explain when one narrow category of
releases will be effective based on published opinions).
85.
See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (reiterating the
basic legal principle that "like cases should be decided alike").
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the parties' expectations as to outcomes. 86 To the extent that parties litigate
in order to resolve outcome uncertainty, that litigation would be less
necessary. Cost savings might result.
Despite this tendency toward fewer cases and lower costs, net reductions
in caseloads and costs likely would be modest. Parties litigate for many
reasons, and dispute resolution is only one of them. Litigation would
continue in order to obtain discovery,8 7 delay, 88 or control over
adversaries.8 9 If third parties such as lenders or rating agencies concluded
that they reliably could predict litigation outcomes, financing litigation
90
would become easier, and people might bring more claims.
Predictability would also benefit particular parties by informing their
litigation strategies. A plaintiff that knew its likelihood of winning in both
state and federal court could choose the "better" court from its perspective.
Parties could do cost-benefit analyses to determine what issues were worth
raising.
Predictability would enable parties who contemplated illegal actionHolmes's "bad man"-to calculate the likely consequences. If the legal
system were well-designed, that predictability would not be a problem. The
pattern of incentives would encourage socially productive conduct. At
present, however, the legal system is not well-designed. Armed with outcome
predictions, the Holmesian bad man might have a field day. The legislature
that authorizes court-system transparency should stand by to fix the

86. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction,53 VILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 11, on file with the Iowa Law Review) (asserting that if the
equation for prediction of legal outcomes "is available to all sides, the number of lawsuits might
remain at zero").
87. See, e.g., id. ("Another hindrance to settlement might be that party A cannot evaluate
the strength of her position without using the tools of court-supported discovery to extract
information withheld by party B."). Parties also abuse discovery in order to obtain information
for a variety of other purposes. Such abuses might continue in a transparent court system, but
the likelihood of discovery and sanction probably would increase.
88. Defendants who know full well that they will lose their cases often continue to litigate
them to obtain delay. This motive dominates defense of what generally are referred to as "debt
collection" cases. Debtors may use the time to obtain money to pay or to judgment-proof
themselves.
89. The existence of litigation alters one's relationship with adversaries. The control may
be formal, as when a bankruptcy filing imposes an automatic stay, or informal, as when one's
opponent "voltntarily" stops the conduct complained of in the lawsuit to avoid the possibility of
offending a judge or jury pending a decision. Either kind of relationship can be viewed as a
method of controlling the adversary.
90. Empirical studies indicate that the large majority of valid legal claims are never
brought. PAUL C. WEILER, A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 73 (1993) (estimating that only one in fifty patients

who suffer negligent medical injury file malpractice claims).

94 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2009]

numerous inconsistencies in the legal system that the bad men would
discover through transparency and seek to exploit.91
A certain amount of embarrassment for public officials is inevitable. For
example, when Paris Hilton went to jail in Los Angeles, she brought the
media spotlight with her, creating her own court-transparency hotspot. I,
like most Los Angeles residents, learned for the first time that a sentence of
forty-five days in jail actually means three days in jail. 9 2 The apparent

purpose of the courts in using "forty-five" to mean "three" was to be able to
give short sentences while appearing to the public to give long ones. The
media spotlight thwarted that purpose and exposed the officials involved to
criticism.
In a transparent court system, such embarrassments would occur more
frequently because the media could more easily discover and document
inconsistencies. That, however, is a positive attribute of a transparent court
system. Embarrassment and the threat of embarrassment are the very
mechanisms by which transparency leads to improvement.
Because we know so little about what actually happens in the courts,
predictions of the levels of embarrassment that would result from
transparency are difficult to make. My guess is that levels initially would be
high. Two embarrassing factors-the identity of the judge and the quality of
legal representation-probably would prove to be the most powerful
predictors of who wins in court.93 In addition, researchers have already
documented huge differences from city to city in the way that courts apply
the same laws.

94

In some circumstances, the law requires courts to predict outcomes in
other courts. For example, in diversity cases, the law requires federal courts
to predict what state courts would do. 95 There are numerous other

91. Samaha, supra note 86, at 24 ("Perhaps these actors would use the information [from
court transparency] to bend the courts to an injurious political will, or to 'game the system."').
92. Los Angeles attorney Robert Shapiro explained the practice on CNN: "Somebody gets
a 45-day sentence. They go in. They either get booked and released immediately or serve a
maximum of three days. That's reality. I'm not saying it's right. I'm not saying it's wrong. That's
what happens in almost every single case." Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: ParisHilton Back in Jail
(CNN television broadcast June 8, 2007), transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/0706/08/acd.01 .html.
93. See authorities cited supra notes 2-3.
94. LoPucki, Legal Culture, supra note 6, at 1504-08 (1996) (documenting sharp
geographical differences in subordination of insider debt in chapter 11 cases); Teresa A.
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture:
Twenty Years of Experiencefrom the FederalBankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 82226 (1994) (documenting sharp geographical differences in debtors' exercise of the choice
between chapter 7 and chapter 13).
95. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that a federal court sitting
in diversity must apply the substantive law of the relevant state); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent
and Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5
(1994) ("'In [diversity] cases, the courts' task is to try to predict how the highest court of that
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examples. 96 These requirements facially suggest that predictions based on
court-file data might be helpful.
Unfortunately, they would not be. As Professor Michael Dorf
convincingly argued, the prediction contemplated by those requirements is
fundamentally different from the prediction under discussion here.9 7 To
borrow Schauer's example, federal courts in West Virginia should not rule
in favor of coal companies, because coal companies always win in that state's
highest court. 98 The obligation to predict what another court would do
should be interpreted to require the predicting court to work solely from
"impersonal principles" of law. 99 In other words, the courts should
deliberately reject the best predictors-the actual pattern of past
outcomes-and continue to use the legal materials recommended by
Holmes.
Transparency's contribution to those required predictions would be to
expose differences in results from the two kinds of analyses. If regression
analysis showed that the coal-company variable is the best predictor of
victory in the West Virginia Supreme Court, that finding would prove the
West Virginia Supreme Court deficient. 100 If, on the other hand, the factors
identified by impersonal principles of law caused legal outcomes, those
factors would dominate regression models. If nonlegal factors were not
persistently significant in the models, that would show that the legal system
was working as it was supposed to work.
In sum, greater predictability may or may not significantly reduce
litigation. But even if it does not, predictability would tend to increase the
social utility of the litigation that persists. Transparency would tend to
reform the court system in accord with policymakers' preferences. That

State would decide the question."' (quoting Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241

(1991))).
96. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 690-95 (1995)
(discussing the obligation of a single U.S. Supreme Court justice to predict whether four
justices will vote to grant certiorari).
97.

Id.

98.
See Schauer, supra note 74, at 783. Schauer compares two predictors of victory in the
West Virginia Supreme Court:
For if one actually looks at the cases dealing with injunctions decided by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals from 1920 to 1954, one would likely discover
that the principle "the coal company wins" has substantially more predictive power
than the principle "a party who delays claiming its rights to the detrimental
reliance of another party is precluded from obtaining an injunction."
Id.
99.
Dorf, supra note 97, at 686 (referring to "the requirement that judges justify their
decisions according to impersonal principles").
100.
I assume that variables representing the factors that legally should be controlling the
outcomes have been included in the regression analysis and found to be less important.
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would strengthen incentives to bring the types of litigation that serve the
public interest.
E.

ENHANcEMENT OFTHE INFORMA7ION INFRASTRUCTURE

Court-system transparency would also provide the public with a valuable
source of general information. In our society, the most valuable kinds of
information are not for sale to the public. They include information about
specific individuals, the many kinds of lifestyles available in society, and how
people enter or succeed in an occupation or business, to name just a few.101
Litigated matters, from the wills of the rich and famous 02 to the
bankruptcies of large public companies, 10 3 are forced into public view. In
the process, otherwise private information becomes public. The fact-rich
adventure stories of the litigants may not always be the truth, but the
adversarial process through which the facts emerge does as much as
humanly possible to test them. Legal education and law practice have always
been valued for the unique window they offer into a variety of lives,
occupations, and activities. By offering direct access to court records, a
transparent court system would vastly multiply the capacity and effectiveness
of this window.
Litigation is when the facts come out. Litigation over police tactics
makes police tactics visible. Litigation over the safety of a drug or product
reveals all of the research on that drug or product-whether published or
"proprietary." Litigation over an asset-securitization transaction may bring to
light how parties constructed the transaction. Litigation over organized
crime exposes its inner workings. Experts on every conceivable scientific
issue and a vast array of unscientific ones testify as witnesses in litigation. A
transparent court system would make all of that knowledge readily available
to those who want or need it. That knowledge would break up information
monopolies, promote competition, and ultimately increase economic
activity. Because the courts are among the most information-rich institutions
in society, transparent courts would be among society's principal suppliers of
knowledge.
F

REDUCTION OFLAWYER AND LI7IGANT ERROR

Two of the most common kinds of lawyer malpractice are (1) missing a
deadline and (2) omitting necessary information from a filed document.

101. Ersatz versions are, of course, readily available in the form of newspapers, magazines,
websites, books, and films, but those come with scant means for assessing their accuracy.
102. E.g., Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 555, 559-67 (2008)
(describing the distinction between wills, which are public, and trusts, which are private, while
including a few details from the wills ofJacqueline Kennedy Onassis and Doris Duke).
103. E.g., LOPUCKI, supra note 47, passim (using numerous examples from court files to
describe the large-public-company-bankruptcy process).
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Court-system transparency could almost completely eliminate both kinds of
errors.
Consider, for example, the rule that a trustee in a chapter 7 bankruptcy
case must assume an executory contract within sixty days after the order for
relief. 10 4 Under current practice, it is the responsibility of the trustee to
know of this deadline and comply with it. In a transparent court system, the
entry of an order for relief, the appointment of a trustee, and the filing of a
schedule of executory contracts could, in combination, automatically trigger
notice to the trustee of the deadline's existence and a series of increasingly
insistent reminders as the deadline approached. The reminders would cease
if the trustee filed an election to assume, or indicated his or her intention
not to assume, each executory contract listed.
In the current system, lawyers commonly file documents that omit
necessary information. A transparent court system could alert the filing
lawyer of the insufficiency of the filed document in the same way that the
order form on a commercial website alerts buyers that they have not
furnished a required email address or a sixteen-digit credit card number.
The system would immediately afford the lawyer the opportunity to correct
the error.
Newly instituted federal-court privacy rules prohibit the inclusion of
Social Security numbers and a few other kinds of personal information in
court files. Commentators urge lawyers to vet the documents they file for
violations. In a transparent court system, the courts' computers could
automatically check that vetting before the system accepted each document
for filing.
Automation would also provide the foundation necessary for the
application of artificial intelligence to litigation. That is, based on the status
of the case as gleaned from the relational data in the court file, an "expert"
algorithm could make suggestions to the lawyers. For example, the
algorithm might suggest the possibility of bankruptcy or Truth in Lending
Act claims to the defendant in a mortgage-foreclosure action. 10 5 When a
party seeks to pierce a corporate veil the algorithm might suggest
consideration of the related doctrines of agency and direct action. In the
foreclosure of a security interest in personal property, the algorithm might

104. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1) (2000).
105. Katherine Porter, Owning Up: Homeowners in Bankruptcy (2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review) (reporting a Hale & Dorr Legal Services Center
study finding that six of twenty-two mortgagees (twenty-seven percent) over-claimed in
bankruptcy and that defenses to the mortgages or proofs of claim existed in fifty-four percent of
the cases).
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remind the plaintiff of the necessity to continue the filing that perfects the
10 6
security interest.
These kinds of systems can be, and sometimes are, built into software
used by one of the parties or the court. Running them in the court files
would add three dimensions to their capability. First, the software could use
data generated by opponents and courts as well as data generated by the
user to formulate its suggestions. Second, the software could use data from
other cases within the same court system. Third, the court could operate the
system, making it possible to code rather than promulgate court procedures
and policies. For example, if the rule required particular recitals in a
motion, the automated system could refuse to accept a motion that did not
contain them. By coding court rules, the courts can make it literally
impossible to violate them.
Transparency can also reduce other kinds of errors by enabling clients
to identify and hire the most effective lawyers. The publication of
comparative-provider statistics in the field of medicine established that those
who did procedures most frequently were best at doing them. 10 7 The same is
true in law. 108 In a transparent court system, prospective clients could hire
from among the lawyers most active or most successful in the particular kind
of case.
The press and public already evaluate judges on the basis of the
percentage of their decisions that are reversed on appeal. 10 9 In a transparent
court system, evaluators would have more information with which to work. 110
They could also evaluate on the basis of reversals in unreported opinions or
on the basis of the frequency of appeals from ajudge's decision.

See U.C.C. § 9-515 cmt. 4 (2005) ("Subsection (c) ... imposes a new burden on the
106.
secured party: to be sure that a financing statement does not lapse during the debtor's

bankruptcy.").
107.
states:

MICHAEL A. MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE 192 (1997)

Millenson

Among heart surgeons performing at least one hundred procedures a year, the
risk-adjusted death rate ranged from zero to 11 percent. For those doing fewer
than one hundred operations, by contrast, the death rates of individual surgeons
ran as high as 82 percent for a doctor doing only nine cases.
Id.
108.

Harris et al., supra note 3, at 250 (finding that malpractice attorneys with more

experience get better results).

109. Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court's Thoughts? The High Price of JudicialElections, 3
Nw.J.L. & SOC. POL'y 29, 50, 53, 55 (2008) (criticizing particularjudges as "the most reversed");
Nina Bernstein, ImmigrationJudges FacingYearly Performance Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at

A14 (reporting on the Attorney General's announcement of"annual performance evaluations"
for immigration judges, with particular attention to judges with high reversal rates, backlogs, or
complaints).

110. Courts write opinions in only a small proportion of the cases they decide. See supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
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In many cases, particularly small claims and consumer bankruptcies,
parties proceed without lawyers. These pro se litigants face the same
problems that lawyers face, but without the knowledge and resources that
the lawyers have. They are in even greater need of the guidance that a
partially automated court system could provide.
In theory, courts could provide these kinds of services without
becoming transparent. But to provide the services, the courts would have to
adopt transparency's prerequisite infrastructure. That is, the courts would
have to cease charging user fees and require parties to file machine-readable
documents containing information in relational formats. Almost inevitably,
transparency would be a byproduct of those changes.
G. AUTOMATION OFDOCUMENTSERVICE AND FILE MAINTENANCE

Eliminating the restrictions on access to court-file documents would
also improve court-system efficiency in more mundane ways. Parties and
their attorneys need constantly to be aware of what is occurring in litigation.
Today, they achieve that awareness through a complex process in which
lawyers "serve" filed documents on other parties to the litigation and all
parties forward copies to their clients. Because a transparent court system
would not charge user fees, it could automatically and immediately serve all
filed documents by email to anyone who had indicated a desire to receive
them. Each recipient could control what documents it elected to receive and
the email address at which it elected to receive them. Neither the lawyers
nor the clients would need to maintain their own copies of the courts' files
because all could access the courts' copies as easily as they could access their
own. Software could eliminate document boundaries to provide users with
1
whole-case views. 11
IV. OBJECTIONS TO TRANSPARENCY

From a systems standpoint, transparency has virtually no drawbacks.
Transparency would reveal so-called "personal" information about
individuals. Personal information that is in court files, however, is already
public record. In cases where the harm from court-file revelation of personal
information might outweigh the benefits, the law already authorizes the
courts to make the information secret. The courts accomplish that by
"sealing" all or part of a record for cause. 112

111. Silverman, supra note 14, at 198 ("Imagine, for example, being able to display
simultaneously the conflicting factual claims contained in a plaintiff's complaint and a
defendant's answer, or an argument and its critique culled from one side's memorandum in
support of a motion and the other side's memorandum in opposition.").
112. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (authorizing the courts to seal records in bankruptcy
cases); Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Those
who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the
high threshold of showing that 'compelling reasons' support secrecy. A 'good cause' showing
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Transparency would alter the balance of power in the courts. The
courts are already transparent to those with the financial ability to access the
data. For example, the insurance industry compiles, and shares internally,
detailed information on the outcomes of claims against insurance
companies.113 That information gives insurance companies an advantage
over claimants in evaluating claims for settlement. The insurance industry
selectively provides that information to researchers sympathetic to the
industry's interests, 114 thus biasing research in the industry's favor. By
making information available to both sides in litigation, transparency would
tend to level the playing field.
Those with greater financial ability might tend to reap greater
advantage from transparency, because they could afford more sophisticated
analyses. This tendency would be moderated, however, by the existence of
more than 10,000 law professors-who are already paid to conduct and
publish research and constitutionally inclined to side with the have-nots.
Most do not perform empirical research today. But that is already changing,
and if the data were available, it would change more rapidly.
Transparency's opponents can be expected to raise at least five kinds of
arguments in opposition: (1) transparency would be costly; (2) it would
harm litigants by exposing them to embarrassment, identity theft, or the
aggregation of personal information; (3) it would invade their privacy by
rendering "practically obscure" information discoverable; (4) it would
pressure judges to decide cases badly; and (5) it would facilitate the copying
of lawyers' work product. None of those objections is well taken. Each is
considered here separately.
A.

COST

Despite the efficiency of automated research, the aggregate cost of
court-system transparency would be substantial. Nearly all of the cost,
however, would be for research design time. The research designers would
be volunteers, so the cost to the government would be negligible.
The government need only do two things. First, the government must
require judges and parties to record as much court information as is
practical in relational formats. The added expense would be negligible.
Courts and lawyers have already discovered that the use of forms and
templates saves effort and money. In the bankruptcy courts, for example,
dozens of documents-including some court orders-are filed on
standardized forms. Lawyers in every field use word-processing templates for
under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to nondispositive motions."
(quoting Phillips exrel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1135-36 (2002))).
113.
Tom Baker, Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in
TRANSPARENCY IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Joseph Doherty & Robert T. Reville eds.,

forthcoming 2008).
114. Id.
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the documents they file, changing only the portions of each document that
are case specific. Those forms and templates could just as easily be dataenabled forms.
Second, for courts to be transparent, the government must release
court information unconditionally, without charge. Recall that researchers
must be able to automate the entire process of data acquisition, analysis, and
display. Government restrictions on further dissemination of court data,
such as those that Professor Daniel Solove would impose, 115 would force
researchers to either (1) disseminate their data one user at a time so that
they could enforce the restrictions, or (2) refuse to disseminate their data at
all. Many researchers could not afford to do the former. Even if they could,
dissemination would be more difficult and fewer users would have access.
Some researchers would refuse to disseminate their data at all, making their
studies "black boxes" that other researchers could neither replicate nor
verify. Others would decline to study court data because they could not
disseminate their data in a manner that satisfied the data-dissemination
16
standards of their discipline.1
If the government imposed even a small charge for data, the effect
would be to reduce sharply the number of studies conducted and to change
their nature from scientific to commercial. Consider, for example, PACER's
charge of eight cents a page for document downloads. Even a simple study
that downloaded and compared data from two or three documents in each
of one hundred cases would cost in excess of $100. That amount is trivial for
a law firm billing its clients at $500 per hour of attorney time, but current
PACER charges severely limit students conducting empirical research in lawschool seminars. Any per-page charge, however small, for court data would
prevent students-and many faculty members-from automatically updating
their studies.
Granting fee exemptions to academic researchers would not solve the
cost problem. The courts already grant such exemptions. One problem is
that the courts may grant, deny, or condition them in ways that encourage
researchers to portray the courts in a positive light. 1 7 Another is that each
bankruptcy or district court grants exemptions for only its own records. A
researcher can conduct exempt nationwide research only by obtaining an
exemption from each of the ninety-eight federal districts. Even if the
application process were consolidated, the system would still have to
distinguish and restrict exempt researchers. The minimum necessary
restriction would be that the exempt researcher could not transfer data to
115. Professor Daniel Solove has proposed that government place restrictions on retransfer
of court data as a condition of the data's release. See infra text accompanying note 171-75.
116. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 46-47 (2002)
(describing political-science standards requiring data dissemination to facilitate replication).
117. For example, after I released research that was critical of the New York bankruptcy
court, that court denied my request for an exemption.
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already been

PERSONAL IDEN7IFICATION AND PRIVACY

Law is mainly about people. So are public court records. Those records
reveal who committed crimes, filed lawsuits, lost lawsuits, perjured
themselves, divorced, filed bankruptcy, or cheated their partners. Such
information is tremendously valuable. Public court records are principal
contributors to credit reports, background and employment investigations,
and criminal-records checks. I will refer to the information that a searcher
could obtain about a particular individual from a transparent court system as
"reputation data." The reputation-data benefits of transparency would come
in addition to the statistical-analysis benefits.
Alan Westin defined "informational privacy" as "the claim of
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how
119
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others."
That claim conflicts directly with the goal of court-system transparency.
By making court records public, the courts long ago rejected the privacy
claim.1 20 The rejection, however, was neither complete nor final. The courts
have long recognized the need to treat some court records as private by
"sealing" them. As part of the process of computerization and electronic
release of court records, the courts must now grapple with the possible need
for additional privacy restrictions.
Commissions and committees (hereinafter "public-access committees")
appointed by the state and federal governments are doing the grappling.
Some have already reported.12 ' Others are still deliberating. In most

118. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17 (discussing the adverse consequences of
restrictions on data dissemination).
119. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
120. See, e.g., Doe v. Heitler, 26 P.3d 539, 544 (Colo. App. 2001). In Heitler,the court noted:
A claim that a court file contains extremely personal, private, and confidential
matters is generally insufficient to constitute a privacy interest warranting the
sealing of the file. Likewise, prospective injury to reputation, an inherent risk in
almost every civil lawsuit, is generally insufficient to overcome the strong
presumption in favor of public access to court records.
Id.
121.
See, e.g., COMM'N ON PUB. ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO THE CHIEFJUDGE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2004), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/publicaccess/

reportpublicaccess-courtrecords.pdf (recommending that court records already deemed
public should not be subject to additional restrictions when posted to the Internet); SUPREME
COURT OF FLA., COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS, PRIVACY, ACCESS, AND COURT RECORDS
(2005) [hereinafter COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS], available at http://www.flcourts.
org/gen.public/stratplan/privacy.shtml
(making a general policy statement in favor of
electronic access).
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jurisdictions, electronic release of court records is in its early stages and the
governing privacy regulations are not yet settled.
A reasonably clear pattern already exists, however, in the
recommendations. The predominant view is that court files should be
available online to the same extent that they are available at the
courthouse.1 22 As part of a "go slow" implementation policy, the committees
recommend that courts begin online release, observe the effects, and then
decide how and how far to continue. 123 Some contemplate permanently
omitting the most sensitive kinds of cases from online release. Those kinds
include domestic violence, child abuse,juvenile, social security, and criminal
124
cases.
Privacy advocates generally seek to block the release of court records
that contain "personal information." "Personal information" has a variety of
meanings. Under the narrowest definition, it refers to the human identifiers
most commonly used by credit-reporting agencies as passwords to identify
people: Social Security number, birth date, mother's maiden name, and the
like. Under the broadest definition, it includes information regarding an
identifiable person, whether or not the information is sensitive. In Florida,
the effect of a decision to block the release of records containing personal
information was to almost completely eliminate public access to court
records. 125

The recently adopted privacy policy of the federal courts requires
removal or redaction of only four, narrowly defined types of personal
information from case files prior to release. They are (1) Social Security
numbers, except for the last four digits; (2) financial-account numbers,
except for the last four digits; (3) birth dates, except for the year; and (4)
126
the names of minors, except for the initials.

122. E.g., CAL. R. CT. 2.503(b) (2007) ("A court that maintains the following records in
electronic form must provide electronic access to them, both remotely and at the courthouse,
to the extent it is feasible to do so: . . . (2) All records in civil cases, except those listed in

(c) (1)-(6).").

123.
SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF PUB. ACCESS TO RECORDS OF THE
JUDICIAL BRANCH, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO RECORDS OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 47-48 (June
2004) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/access/

accessreport.htm ("The advisory committee's recommendations on Internet access should be
viewed as the first step in a go-slow approach to providing more remote access to
information.").
124. E.g., CAL. R. CT. 2.503(c) (excepting records in the following proceedings: (1) under
the Family Code, (2) juvenile court, (3) guardianship or conservatorship, (4) mental health,
(5) criminal, and (6) civil harassment).
125. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS, supra note 121, at 33 ("After lengthy struggle,
the Committee has therefore reluctantly reached the conclusion that implementation of a
system that allows large volumes of court records to be released electronically cannot be
achieved at this time.").
126. FED. R. CIv. P. 5.2 (containing the redaction rules).
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This Part considers the transparency implications of the privacy
restrictions that courts adopt. The discussion proceeds in three steps.
Section 1 explains the need for personally identifying information for
statistical analyses and the extent to which the federal view might impair
those analyses. Section 2 examines the difficulty of de-identifying court
records in a world where court proceedings will remain public. Section 3
addresses four bases on which privacy advocates are pressing for further
restrictions on access and the manner in which each threatens transparency.
1. The Need for Identification in Court Records
Privacy advocates generally seek to force removal of personally
identifying information from court records prior to their release. Such
removal is referred to as "de-identification." To the extent that courts deidentify records, the user is unable to match them to, or associate them with,
any particular person.
For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act
("HIPAA") privacy regulations require health-care providers to de-identify
medical records before releasing them for research. HIPAA's deidentification safe harbor permits the release of medical records after
redaction of these data items: (1) names; (2) postal addresses, but not city,
state, and zip code; (3) fax numbers; (4) e-mail addresses; (5) Social Security
numbers; (6) medical-record and other account numbers; (7) certificate
and license numbers, including automobile-license numbers; (8) device
identifiers and serial numbers; (9) URLs; (10) IP addresses; (11) biometric
identifiers, including finger and voice prints; and (12) full-face
photographic images. 127 The purpose of these restrictions is to prevent the
researchers who work with the de-identified medical records from knowing
the patient's identity.
De-identified court records can be linked to no person and so can
provide no reputation data. In theory, researchers can still perform
statistical analyses with de-identified data. Those analyses, however, suffer
from at least three important limitations.
First, the researcher cannot validate the records by checking them
against the phenomena that they supposedly represent. 28 De-identified
records are merely an unverifiable representation by the government that
such people exist and such events occurred. If the government simply
invented an internally consistent, de-identified data set, the researcher
receiving the data set would have no way to know it was a fake. Indeed, one
method of de-identifying data is to create a "synthetic" data set that
supposedly has the same relevant characteristics as the sets for which they

127. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2006).
128. The usual method is to check randomly selected entries in the data against the
represented events until the researcher is confident of the quality of the data.
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are substituted. 129 None of the records in a synthetic data set, however,
actually represents a real person or event. They too are fake.
Researchers and the press verify court-system data using a variety of
methods. If the government compiled the data from court records in whole
or in part, the researchers may check the data against those court records.
This method has turned up startling levels of inaccuracy in the court data
130
furnished to researchers by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
31
and the U.S. Sentencing Commission. A second method is for researchers
or journalists to identify independently people and events that should
appear in the government's data and then determine whether they do. This
method led to the recent discovery that both the Connecticut and federal
courts illegally concealed thousands of court files from the public.' 3 2 Had

Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, Counting on Confidentiality: Legal and Statistical
129.
Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the USA Patriot Act, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1033, 1119-20
(discussing the shortcomings of synthetic data).
130.
The history of misleading data from the Administrative Office is lengthy. In the late
1980s, the Administrative Office furnished William Whitford and me with a purported list of
bankrupt companies reporting assets of over $100 million. We checked the list against other
sources and were unable to confirm the existence of many of the cases. Later, BankruptcyJudge
Lisa Fenning discovered the source of the problem: large numbers of "phantom" $100 million
cases emanating from a poorly drafted question on the bankruptcy cover sheet. Lisa Hill
Fenning & Craig A. Hart, MeasuringChapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 119, 123 (1996) (reporting that in forty-one of 262 chapter 11 cases (16%), debtors
erroneously reported assets in the $100,000 category as being in the $100 million category). At
about that same time, Jennifer Frasier found that "[t] he debtor's assets, liabilities, and number
of creditors as shown on the face sheet are inaccurate 20 to 25 percent of the time." Jennifer
Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of Bankruptcy Statistics, 101 CoM. L.J.
307, 340 (1996). Id. at 340-41 (defining "inaccurate" to mean placed in the wrong one of
several categories and describing high levels of errors by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts in bankruptcy statistical reporting). The overall error rate rises from fourteen percent to
twenty percent as the data are captured from the documents. Id.
In early 2007, a group of scholars, myself included, discovered substantial differences
between the numbers of bankruptcy filings reported in Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics and
the numbers of files on PACER. The discrepancies numbered in the thousands of cases. We
ultimately discovered that the Administrative Office classifies the reopening of a bankruptcy
case as an additional case, because the debtor pays a fee for reopening. Thus, the
Administrative Office counted fees and called them cases. Even after adjustment for that
difference, the number of files on PACER still did not reconcile with the number of cases
reported by the Administrative Office.
131.
Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark A. Cohen, Evaluating Trends in Corporate
Sentencing: How Reliable Are the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Data?, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 108, 108
(2000) ("[A] substantial number of cases seem to be missing from the Commission's data on
organizational sanctions. Indeed, the data do not appear to be representative of the underlying
case population.").
132.
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2004). The court stated:
Between 2002 and 2003, the newspaper plaintiffs learned that, over the prior 38
years, the Connecticut state court system had adjudicated what appeared to be
thousands of cases where sealing procedures prohibited court personnel from
allowing the public to access the files in those proceedings and, in certain
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the publicly disclosed records been de-identified, neither method could
have been used. The concealments might never have been discovered. Deidentification removes all information linking the released data set to the
underlying reality.
Second, de-identification hampers research by preventing researchers
133
from linking court records with other records regarding the same person.
Researchers may need to link court records to (1) records of jails and
prisons regarding incarceration of criminals; 134 (2) Megan's Law databases;
(3) property-tax records, including those on zillow.com; (4) professionallicensing records for lawyers, doctors, accountants, stock brokers, and other
professions; (5) arrest records; (6) records of political contributions; (7)
fictitious-name registries; (8) birth and death records; (9) news stories; and
(10) databases compiled from any combination of the above. 135 Some
private parties might wish to link them to their own databases of employees,
customers, or insureds or to the membership lists of professional
organizations. The number of possible studies declines geometrically with
reductions in the number of databases available for matching. Deidentification limits each research project to a single, isolated database.
Third, de-identification
hampers transparency by preventing
researchers from matching identities within the data set. Thus researchers
would not know whether the filers of two bankruptcy cases were the same
comparatively rare instances, from acknowledging the existence of these cases
altogether.
Id. After media organizations reported the disappearance of hundreds of federal criminal cases,
see, for example, Press Release, Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Hidden Docketing
System Keeps Hundreds of Cases Shrouded in Nation's Capital (Mar. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=6637, the Judicial Conference "strongly urged"
courts to report "case under seal" not "case does not exist." REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judconf/07MarchProceedings.pdf. Illegal secret dockets have also been a
problem in other state-court systems. Bruce Rishton, The Curious Case of 2007MR219; Search
WarrantAppears, Disappears,Reappears on Court Docket, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), May 8, 2007,
at 1 (reporting the existence of sealed cases with no public dockets in Illinois).
133. Matching de-identified records to identified records would defeat the purpose of deidentification by giving the researcher the identities of the de-identified subjects. Matching deidentified records to other dce-identified records does not reveal the identities of either set of
subjects. It requires, however, a common identifier by which to make the match. Unless a single
person de-identified the two sets of records and created the common identifier for the purpose
of linking them, such a common identifier would not exist.
134. For example, identified data are available on prisoners held by the Florida
Department of Corrections. Fla. Dep't of Corr., Offender Information Search, http://www.dc.
state.fl.us/AppCommon/searchall.asp?Action=Find&SexOffOnly=0 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
135. E.g., John Golmant & Tom Ulrich, Bankruptcy Repeat Filings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 169, 174-75 (2006) (reporting a study in which the researchers obtained Social Security
numbers from public court records); John Golmant & Tom Ulrich, Aging and Bankruptcy, AM.
BANKR.J., May 2007, at 27 (reporting a later study in which the researcher matched the Social
Security numbers to "public records accessible through Lexis and Westlaw" to obtain birth dates
and reports on aging of bankruptcy filers).
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person, whether the defendants in two medical-malpractice actions were the
same doctor, whether the persons convicted in two criminal cases were the
same person, or whether a group of identical lawsuits were multiple filings
by the same person or separate filings by different persons. 136 The
government agency that de-identifies the records could make these links for
the researcher. But then the researcher could have no way of knowing
precisely how, or how well, the agency made the matches.
2.

The Difficulty of De-Identifying Court Records

American courts are open to the public. The public and the press have
a constitutional right to attend criminal and civil trials and hearings. 137 No
one proposes to eliminate that right. Nor is there any way that the
participants in those trials and hearings can be de-identified. To the extent
that they are relevant, witnesses will continue to speak the names, addresses,
and other identifying information regarding the parties-even when the
parties are minor children. The press will continue to report them, and
information brokers and busybodies will continue to collect them.
Thus, court-record de-identification can do no more than eliminate one
channel-the court file-through which that information might flow. Deidentification could reduce the likelihood that any given person could
discover any given fact. It could not, however, make what someone said
publicly private again. De-identification can protect private information,
such as that given in confidence to the census bureau or to a medical
provider. But it cannot protect information spoken in a public courtroom.
When data are de-identified, steps are usually taken to prevent reidentification. One such step is to remove non-identifying information that
might be combined with other information to re-identify the subject. That is
easier to do with medical records than with court records. Medical records
report symptoms and bodily conditions likely to be known only to the
patient and the physician who made the record. Researchers cannot use
their knowledge of particular patients' medical conditions to reattach
identities because researchers do not know the medical conditions of
significant numbers of patients.
By contrast, court records report events likely to have occurred in
public and even likely to have been discussed in newspaper articles.
Researchers using de-identified court records could match the stories in

136. The last reference is to a ploy by which some lawyers pick their judges. Most courts
assign judges randomly. To beat that system, the lawyer files several copies of a case until the
lawyer draws a desired judge. The lawyer then dismisses all of the cases except the lucky one.
Several versions of this ploy exist. E.g., No Judge-ShoppingAllowed, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A8
(reporting that an attorney paid sanctions of $7,500 for filing thirteen lawsuits then
withdrawing all but one in a case involving Dr.Jack Kevorkian).
137. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("[T]he right to
attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment .... ).
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those records to the stories in newspaper articles-or gossip-to reattach
identities. Stripping all details that would enable researchers to reattach
identities would protect "privacy," but only by stripping away the nonidentifying information needed for research.
3.

The Privacy Objections

Privacy advocates seek at least four kinds of limitations on court-system
transparency. First, they seek to protect subjects from specific kinds of harms
that might result from making identified court data public. Second, they
seek to preserve the "practical obscurity" of court data even in situations
where they can identify no harm that would flow from its release. Third, they
seek to de-identify court data so that the data cannot be matched or
aggregated by human identities. Finally, they seek to place contractual
restrictions on released court data to prevent commercial use or resale.
a.

Identity Theft and Other Specific Harms

Identity theft results from the business practice of treating a person's
knowledge of a customer's Social Security number, credit card number, or
birth date (hereinafter "identity-theft data") as proof that the person is the
customer.13 8 So long as businesses continue that practice, revealing a
person's identity-theft data would expose that person to the possibility of
identity theft.
To my knowledge, no evidence exists that court records have been a
significant source of information used in identity theft. Nevertheless, publicaccess committees have generally recommended that identity-theft data be
omitted from court records or redacted from court records prior to the
records' release. If the court records are not machine readable, finding and
removing identity-theft data is impractical. Under the committees'
recommendations, the records may never qualify for release-even if they
are in electronic, but not machine-readable, form. If the records are
machine readable, court officials can find and remove identity-theft data
with virtually one hundred percent accuracy. Thus, requiring the filing of
court documents in machine-readable formats is likely to reduce, rather
than increase, the risk of identity theft.
Privacy advocates identify a number of other specific harms that can
result from the inclusion of personally identifying information in public
records. They include stalking, domestic violence, and witness intimidation
or killing.1 39 Authority already exists for courts to seal court records when

138.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L.
REv. 89, 99-100 (2001).

139.

E.g.,

intimidation).

RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note 123, at 8-12, 9 n.10 (discussing witness
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they create a significant risk of such problems. 140 Courts, however, seal only
a small proportion of records, and no evidence exists showing that the
current level of record sealing is inadequate to address the problems.
Sealing court records inhibits research by creating two kinds of
problems for researchers. The obvious one is to reduce the number of
records remaining available for research. For example, if the courts
routinely seal the bankruptcy records of domestic-abuse victims, insufficient
numbers of such records might remain for research on domestic-abuse
victims' bankruptcies.
The less obvious problem is to call into question the representativeness
of the unsealed records. To continue with the same example, if a
matrimonial court were to seal twenty percent of its files, researchers would
know nothing about the contents of those files. All might show abuse, or
none might show abuse. If examination of the court's remaining files were
to reveal that two percent show domestic abuse, the researcher could
conclude only that domestic abuse is present in two percent to twenty-two
percent of cases. That range is so broad that such a study would have little
value. Current levels of sealing are, however, low enough not to interfere
with most kinds of court-record research.
b.

PracticalObscurity

Practical obscurity is perhaps the most commonly raised objection to
the electronic release of public court records. 14 1 This objection requires no
threat of harm to anyone from record release. 142 Rather, the objection

140.

See authorities cited supra note 112.
141.
Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1176 (2002) (arguing that the public-private distinction is outmoded and
should be replaced by a new paradigm in which individuals have privacy rights in information
on the public record). Solove argued:
I contend that information privacy must be reconceptualized in the context of
public records to abandon the longstanding notion that there is no claim to

privacy when information appears in a public record .... I suggest that privacy
must be understood as an expectation of a limit on the degree of accessibility of
information.
Id. at 1140; Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: BalancingJudicialAccountability and Privacy in an
Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 325 (2004) ("Courts... recreate in cyberspace

a system that protects the same value that [was] protected by the practical obscurity of paper
[court] records.").

142.

For example, Solove concludes:
Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree of accessibility of information.
Under this alternative view, privacy entails control over and limitations on certain
uses of information, even if the information is not concealed. Privacy can be
violated by altering levels of accessibility, by taking obscure facts and making them
widely accessible.

Solove, supra note 141, at 1178.
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asserts that public court records should be private because they were
difficult to access in the past, and people have come to expect difficulty
143
accessing them.
The objection is based on those scholars' misreading of the Supreme
Court's opinion in United States Department ofJustice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press.144 In that case, the Court held that the government could
not disclose the contents of an FBI rap sheet under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") because the subject of the rap sheet had a privacy
interest in the rap sheet, and its disclosure would constitute an
",unwarranted' invasion of privacy." 145
The Court did not hold, however, that the subject had a privacy interest
in the court records from which the compilation was made. To the contrary,
the Court said that "[p]lainly there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files,
county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and146a
"
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.
The Court recognized that "the power of compilations to affect personal
privacy that outstrips the combined power of the bits of information
contained within." 147 The Court recognized a privacy right in the FBI's
compilation. Nothing in the Court's opinion, however, suggests that the bits
of information in the courts' records should no longer be public or that
members of the public should be barred from compiling their own rap
sheets from them.
To the extent that Reporters Committee relies on the practical obscurity of
court records, it was a decision grounded in the technology of the time. As
the Court put it:
The very fact that federal funds have been spent to prepare, index,
and maintain these criminal-history files demonstrates that the
individual items of information in the summaries would not
otherwise be "freely available" either to the officials who have
access to the underlying files or to the general public. Indeed, if
the summaries were "freely available," there would be no reason to
invoke the FOIA to obtain access to the information they
148
contain.

143.

Id. at 1141 ("I suggest that privacy must be understood as an expectation of a limit on

the degree of accessibility of information."); id. at 1178 ("Our expectation

of

limits on the

degree of accessibility emerges from the fact that information in public records has remained
relatively inaccessible for much of our history."); Winn, supra note 141, at 325.
144. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989).
145.
Id. at 776 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (C) (2000)).
146. Id. at 764.
147. Id. at 765.
148. Id.
at 764.

COURT-SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY

The technology has since changed. Specifically, the Internet developed and
both the state and federal courts computerized their case records. Private
sources now compile rap sheets and make them available. 149 Ajob applicant
can no longer assume that a prospective employer does not have access to
the applicant's criminal record. 150 Thus, criminal records are no longer
practically obscure. Efforts to make court records practically obscure by
erecting artificial barriers to obtaining them are not mandated, and arguably
51
would violate the Americans with Disabilities Act.'
Consistent with this view, public-access committees generally
recommend that court records be available online to the same extent that
they are available at the courthouse. For example, California court rules
require generally that courts keeping electronic records must provide the
public access electronically, both remotely and at the courthouse. 152 But
those rules also provide an exception for six kinds of records that need only
153
be made available at the courthouse.
Critics of such exceptions have noted the potential for data arbitrage. If
data that were not available online were available at the courthouse, service
54
companies would go to the courthouse, get the data, and sell it online.'
The sale price would reflect the difficulty of the courthouse data transfer.
The court might permit flash-drive downloads, thus making data cheap. The
court might limit data transfer to the printing of hard copy. The court might
display the information on the computer screen and provide no means of
printing it. The court might even prohibit users from photographing the
screens, effectively requiring them to retype the information. The more
onerous the data-transfer requirements, the higher the resale price of the
data is likely to be. Such arbitrage would convert privacy into a mere price

E.g., SentryLink, National Criminal Background Check & Sex Offender Check,
149.
http://www.sentrylink.com/web/loadCriminalReport.do (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (offering a
criminal-records search that covers the bulk of criminal courts in the United States).
DEREK HINTON, CRIMINAL RECORDS BOOK 79-86 (2002) (describing the complexities
150.
of employer acquisition and use of criminal-record information). Complete or partial criminal
records from fifteen states are available on LEXIS, Library, DOCKRT, File, and STCRIM.
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) ("No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
151.
such a disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.");
In re Estate of Engelhardt, 804 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 2004) ("Removing case files
from the Internet may implicate the ADA because such removal may preclude access to public
records for those individuals whose disabilities prevent them from traveling to the court.").
152.

CAL. R. CT. 2.503(b).

Id. 2.503(c); see supra note 124 (listing the exceptions).
154.
SeeJUDICLAL CONFERENCE PRIvACY REPORT, supra note 8, at A-7 (referring to "data resellers who, if remote electronic access were restricted, could go to the courthouse, copy the
files, download the information to a private website, and charge for access to that website, thus
profiting from the sale of public information and undermining restrictions intended to protect
privacy").
153.
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differential. Whether the government could eliminate arbitrage by
prohibiting resale of the data is considered below.
The need for such arbitrage would cripple court-system transparency.
Even small per-datum transfer costs become prohibitively large when
multiplied by the quantities of data necessary to achieve court-system
transparency.
c.

PersonalDataAggregation

One of the principal fears of privacy advocates is that, unless court
records are de-identified, users will match them to other records about the
same person and aggregate the information. 155 (Privacy advocates
provocatively describe this as the compilation of "dossiers"-an apparent
attempt to link data aggregation in the U.S. to records kept on individuals by
the secret police in totalitarian regimes.) As previously noted, such matching
and aggregation are necessary to achieve court-system transparency. 156 To
the extent that privacy rules prevent aggregation, they impair the courts'
ability to provide reputation data as well as researchers' ability to analyze
court operations.
Public-access committees universally recommend redacting records in
ways calculated to prevent identity theft. 157 They split, however, on whether
to leave sufficient information on the public record to support data
58
aggregation.1
The relatively pro-transparency federal redaction rules require
redaction of Social Security numbers and financial-account numbers to the
last four digits, 159 redaction of birth dates to the birth year, 160 redaction of
the names of minors to initials, and in criminal cases, redaction of addresses
to city and state.1 6 1 The federal rules require no other redactions. The effect
is to leave enough identification information to support aggregation. Nearly

155. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 44-55 (2004) (describing harms that
supposedly flow from "the aggregation effect"); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 477, 506-11 (2006) (identifying the aggregation of data about individuals as one of
the principal privacy problems).
156. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the need for matching and aggregation).
157. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Shahab Asghar, Summary of State Reports on Public Access to
Court Records passim (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (showing
recommendations that Social Security numbers and financial-account numbers be partially or
completely redacted).
158. See id. (showing diversity in recommendations regarding redaction of birth dates and
addresses and regarding the extent of redaction of Social Security numbers).
159.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037 (proposed), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
orders/courtorders/frbk07p.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
160.

Id.

161.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1(a).
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half the states have rules adopting, or reports recommending that they
162
adopt, the federal redaction scheme.
On the other hand, slightly over half the states have adopted or
163
recommended pro-privacy redaction rules designed to block aggregation.
That view would redact the entire Social Security number and the entire
date of birth, but leave the individual's name on the public record.
Preservation of names would enable the public record to continue to
provide some reputation data, though with considerable risk that the
reputations would attach to the wrong people. Complete redaction of Social
Security numbers and birth dates, however, would make both aggregation
and statistical analyses based on aggregation impossible.
The split regarding redaction rules is about aggregation, not privacy in
the traditional sense. In the traditional sense, leaving the individual's name
and story on the public record invades privacy. Private detectives and busybody neighbors interested in a specific individual usually would have no
trouble identifying that individual from the court file. 164 Names and stories,
however, are not sufficient for research. Research requires matching human
165
identities in national data sets.
The pro-privacy redaction rules provide no additional protection
against identity theft. Some creditors and credit-reporting agencies treat
knowledge of a person's Social Security number and birth dates as evidence
that the knower is the person. 166 Both sides in the privacy-transparency
debate condemn that practice and recommend legislation to end it. 16 7 The
practice, however, continues. As a result, one who knows another's entire
Social Security number and birth date might be able to impersonate the
other. Four digits of the Social Security number and the year of birth,
however, do not create that risk.
A person's name, together with the last four digits of his or her Social
Security number and date of birth, are sufficient for matching in national
databases. The only apparent reason for the federal policy that preserves the
last four digits of Social Security numbers is to make such matching possible
and thus facilitate aggregation. Thus, it appears that the federal rules are
deliberately pro-aggregation.
162. LoPucki & Asghar, supra note 157 (showing that a substantial minority of states
recommend not redacting the last four digits of Social Security numbers).
163. Id.
164. Jennifer 8. Lee, Dirty Laundry, Online for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at G1
(reporting complaints about neighbors snooping when court records were placed online).
165. Many people have the same names, and the form of a person's name often varies
through the use of nicknames, initials, aliases, and suffixes.
166. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1281-82
(2003) (describing the process).
167. E.g., Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGs L.J. 1227, 1270 (2003) ("An SSN, mother's maiden name, and birth date should be
prohibited as the method by which access can be obtained to accounts.").

94 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[20091

That facilitation of aggregation is imperfect. While no two people have
the same name and Social Security number, about one person in twentythree has the same name and last four digits as someone else. 1 68 As a result,
matching large databases by name and last four digits would produce a
significant number of false positives. Depending on the specific type of
study, those false positives may be a minor irritant to the researcher or may
make the research impossible.
Bankruptcy rules require bankruptcy filers to identify themselves by full
name, aliases, and Social Security numbers.1 69 The federal redaction rule
thus assures that sufficient information remains for matching the identities
of bankruptcy filers with identities in other databases. In civil and criminal
cases, however, the courts typically do not require parties to identify
themselves by Social Security numbers or dates of birth. As a result, the
court file may not contain an identity sufficient for automated matching
across databases.
Courts adopting the federal view should consider requiring litigants to
identify themselves by last four digits of the Social Security number and year
of birth. That information would facilitate court-system accountability and
make reputation data more accurate without invading any protected privacy
interest of the litigants.

168.
Ten thousand combinations of four digits exist. Thus the odds that two people will
have the same last four digits are about one in 10,000. About 420 million Social Security
numbers have been issued since the program began. Soc. Sec. Admin., New Social Security
Numbers, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/ssn/ssnvolume.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2008). If 300 million of those numbers are currently outstanding, about 30,000 people have any
particular combination of last four digits (300 million / 10,000). I estimate that in a population
of 19,000 people, about 858-roughly one in twenty-three-have the same name. That
estimate is based on the examination of the names on three pages of the UCLA Telephone
Directory 2002-2003. That directory contains about 19,000 names on 198 pages. On the three
pages examined, I found eleven duplicate names and one triplicate name. The standard for
determining names to be duplicates was that the last name be identical, the first name be
identical or a corresponding nickname (e.g., Cathy and Catherine), and that the middle names
or initial not be inconsistent (e.g.,John Williams is considered a duplicate ofJohn K. Williams).
Projecting that total to the entire directory yields an estimate of 858 duplicates among 19,000
people (one in twenty-three). Because the number of possible names in a population is finite,
adding more names from that same population should result in a higher proportion of
duplicates. Thus the ratio of duplicates to population for a population of 30,000 would be
higher than the ratio for a population of 19,000.
169.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009, Official Form 1 (requiring "name of debtor," "all other names
used in the last 8 years," and "last four digits of Soc. Sec.... No."); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(f)
("An individual debtor shall submit a verified statement that sets out the debtor's social security
number, or states that the debtor does not have a social security number.").
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d.

ContractRestrictions to Prevent Commercial Use

Current law permits courts to deny access to court records on the basis
of the requestor's intended use. 170 Once the requestor receives access,
however, the requestor can use the records for any lawful purpose. Professor
Daniel Solove argues that government can, and should, restrict use further.
Specifically, he argues that the government can make a public record
available on the condition that certain information is not disclosed or used
in a certain manner, 171 but cannot establish post-access restrictions on the
disclosure or use of information that is publicly available. 172 Once the
information is made available to the public, the Florida Star v. B.JF. case
prohibits a state from restricting use "by making access conditional on
accepting certain responsibilities when using data-such as using it for
specific purposes, not disclosing it to others, and so on, certain functions of
1 73
transparency can be preserved at the same time privacy is protected."
What Solove apparently has in mind is to allow the kind of research
proposed in this Article, 174 while disallowing the commercial use of court175
system data.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts uses this approach with
respect to an abbreviated case-record database it has released annually since
1970.176 But the use restrictions the Administrative Office imposes are
calculated to prevent research rather than to facilitate it. Specifically, the
government strips the names of the judges and the parties and conditions
the download of the information on the execution of a clickwrap agreement
that prohibits reattaching the names. 177 Such restrictions would be fatal to
court-system transparency.
Restrictions that would prohibit the use of court data-however
obtained-to prepare marketing lists would not significantly hinder courtsystem transparency. But Solove's proposal to bar researchers from
disclosing data to others would. The scientific method relies on the ability of

Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) ("It is uncontested,
170.
however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute. Every court has
supervisory power over its own records and files, and access has been denied where court files
might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.").
171.
Solove, supra note 141, at 1213.
172.

Id.

173.

Id. at 1213-14 (discussing Fla. Star v. BJ.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989)).

174.

Id.

175.
Id. at 1216 ("[A] more appropriate approach is to curtail broad categories of uses (i.e.,
commercial, information brokering, further disclosure, and so on) . . ").
176. ICPSR Inter-Univ. Consortium for Political & Soc. Research, Federal Court Cases:
Integrated Data Base, 2006 (2007), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/
STUDY/04685.xml.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politicsof Access to Federal Court Data, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2161, 2169177.
70 (2002) (describing the arrangement).
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other researchers to reproduce research results.1 78 If the second researcher
proposes to reproduce the research from scratch, the second researcher
would obtain new data from the original source. Restrictions on the first
researcher's data are then irrelevant. Many data sets, however, are too
expensive to reproduce. Researchers today address the problem by making
their data sets publicly available so that later researchers can check their
work. 179 In addition, organizations such as the Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research acquire and preserve data sets for use by
other researchers. 180 My research results are credible, because, if they were
wrong, anyone could use my posted data to prove them wrong. Because my
data sometimes include identified information, businesses could download it
and use it to make marketing lists. Thus, my practice would violate Solove's
restrictions.
Second, the mechanisms of transparency must to some degree be
funded by the users of the research or their patrons. To verify the research
results, both the users and their patrons will sometimes insist upon seeing
the underlying data.
Third, the same data processing would provide both transparency data
and reputation data. The processing costs will be shared by the two kinds of
users. Solove's restrictions would bar the resale of reputation data, thus
1 81
depriving court-system transparency of a principal source of funding.
Some access restrictions might be tolerable. The courts could prohibit
the use of court-file data to compile lists of people for marketing purposes.
The courts could still permit the resale of court-file data, but require that in
the process of resale, the reseller impose the same restrictions. That is,
however, a dangerous path to take. As occurred with credit information, the
82
result may be the de facto denial of access to individuals. 1

178. Ars Technica, Scientists on Science: Reproducibility, http://arstechnica.com/
journals/science.ars/2006/10/25/5744 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) ("If experimental or
descriptive data cannot be reproduced, then they are generally discarded. Reproducibility was
mentioned by several [scientists] as a mechanism by which scientific data becomes viewed as less

tentative.").
179. For example, my coauthor and I have posted the data from our studies of large,
public-company bankruptcies at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
180. Inter-Univ. Consortium for Political & Soc. Research, Mission Statement, http://www.
icpsr.umich.edu/ICPSR/org/mission.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
181.
PACER, PACER On-Line Registration, https://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/psco/cgi-bin/
regform.pl (last visited Jan. 9, 2009) (setting forth the acknowledgment of policies and

procedures that places no restrictions on data use).
182. Because resellers of credit information have legal responsibility for the ultimate use of
the data, credit-reporting agencies are membership organizations. Individuals rarely need
credit information frequently enough to warrant the cost of membership. As a result, only
businesses have de facto access to credit information.
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C. JUDICIAL IADEPENDENCE

A variety of external pressures and threats may make it difficult for
judges to decide cases impartially. Legislators may threaten judges with
budget cuts, job cuts, or impeachment. The press may incite the public
against them. Interest groups may threaten them with political campaigns
that could remove them from office. Disgruntled litigants or political
extremists may threaten them with violence. Describing "the threat to
judicial independence," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently asserted that
"the breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary
83
may be unmatched in American history.'
If the courts operated in secrecy, none of those groups would know
what the courts were doing, and the level of rage about court decisions
undoubtedly would decline. That solution would fail, however, to impose
necessary limits on judicial independence. Scholars from across the political
spectrum agree that judicial independence is not an end in itself. It is merely
the means of assuring that judges are free to decide cases impartially. 8 4 As
one commentator put it:
Most thoughtful scholars recognize that judicial independence is
an instrumental value-a means to achieve other ends. As an
instrumental value, judicial independence has limits, defined by
the purposes it serves. Disagreement persists as to what those
purposes are, but most would accept some variation on the theme
that judicial independence enables judges to follow the facts and
law without fear or favor, so as to uphold the rule of law, preserve
the separation of governmental powers, and promote due
85

process.1

Thus, judicial independence is not freedom to do as a judge pleases, but
rather, freedom to do what a judge should. Some kind of oversight remains
necessary.
In a democracy, that oversight must necessarily come from the
public. 186 The public acts directly in electing judges 8 7 and indirectly in

183. Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to JudicialIndependence, WALL ST.J., Sept. 27,
2006, at Al8.
184. E.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1059 (2007)
("Ujudicial independence is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means of ensuring freedom and
the rule of law."); Frances Kahn Zemans, The AccountableJudge: Guardian ofJudicialIndependence,
72 S. CAL. L. REv. 625, 632 (1999) ("Butjudicial independence is only a means to an end; it is
the mechanism chosen by the Founders to ensure the rule of law.").
185. Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing JudicialAccountabilityfrom the Realm of Political Rhetoric,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 911, 915-16 (2006).
186. E.g., Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal ErrorandJudicialMisconduct: BalancingJudicial
Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1245, 1246 (2004) (noting that the code of
judicial conduct requiresjudges to "respect and comply with the law," to "be faithful to the law,"
and to accord to every person "the right to be heard according to the law").
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electing those who appoint, impose discipline on, and promote judges. To
enable the public to make those decisions, the court system must require
judges to work under some amount of public scrutiny.
Courts institutionalize democracy's claim that it imposes
constraints on state power. In open courts, governmentjudges have
to account for their own authority by letting others know how and
why power is used. Bentham's widely-quoted phrase captures this
activity: "Publicity is the very soul ofjustice [...] It keeps the judge
188
himself, while trying, under trial."
The need for public scrutiny has long been the basis for the current
policy that court records are available to the public. Secret courts are not a
realistic option. The choice is between high and low levels of public
information aboutjudges' actions.
Thus, the systems to be compared are the current one in which court

records are merely public and the proposed one in which court records
would be fully transparent. The standard for comparison is how well each of
these systems could serve the combined goals ofjudicial independence and
judicial accountability.
In the current system, voters have low levels of information about
judicial candidates.18 9 That creates a volatile situation in which particular
decisions can be considered out of context and so provide the basis for
superficial analysis or political attack. 190 Commentators generally
recommend that judges protect themselves by making more information
about themselves and their decisions available to the public. 19 1 For example,
Frances Kahn Zemans argues:

[W]hen it comes to retention in office, it is the individual judge
who must face evaluation. Reporting possible suspect behavior
becomes magnified because typically it is the only information the
187.
"The great majority ofjudges in the United States must periodically win elections in
order to retain their positions." Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and JudicialIndependence: The
Voter's Perspective,64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 16 (2003).
188. Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, From 'Rites' to 'Rights' of Audience: The Utilities and
Contingencies of the Public's Role in Court-Based Processes, in REPRESENTATIONS OF JUSTICE 195, 229
(Antoine Masson & Kevin O'Connor eds., 2007).
189. Baum, supra note 187, at 19 (noting that "contests for judgeships fall firmly in this
'low-information' category").
190. For example, an Iowa state district judge's grant of a divorce to a lesbian couple
resulted in a national controversy. Kathleen Burge, IowaJudge Causes Stir in Granting Gay Divorce,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 2003, at BI.
191. Zemans, supra note 184, at 654 (recommending that to sustain support for judicial
independence, judges should "communicat[e] with the public in ways that will enhance their
legitimacy and justify their independence"); see also Robert E. Drechsel, Dealing with Bad News:
How TrialJudges Respond to Inaccurate and Critical Publicity, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 308, 309 (1988)
(arguing that if the "judiciary is to be meaningfully accountable and understood, the public
must have accurate informative news" from the media).
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public has received. There is not a base of knowledge about
individual judges or the judiciary as a whole against which the
public can evaluate reports of judicial misbehavior. Thus the
invisibility of most judges, while providing the appearance of some
protection against attack, may in fact have the opposite effect. That
is, with no other information about a judge against which to
evaluate a story, whatever is printed or broadcast becomes accepted
"truth."192
One solution, Zemans proposes, is to "provide a template of information
against which a reporter can evaluate judicial behavior."' 93 When the judge
is right and critics are wrong, the effect of making raw court data available is
to vindicate the judge and check the power of critics.
Even in a transparent court system, judicial-election voters would not
know firsthand the details of a judge's decisional record. They would still
rely on intermediaries to process and evaluate those records. 194 The
difference would be in the levels of information available to the
intermediaries. Instead of being dependent on anecdote, the intermediaries
would have access to full records. They could assess in depth the pattern of
all of ajudge's decisions, instead of skimming the surface of a few.
The function of public oversight is not merely to provide assurance that
all is well in the court system. In fact, all is not well. Even at current levels of
transparency, researchers have been able to document the systematic
influence ofjudicial self interest. Numerous factors that should be irrelevant
influence judicial decisions, including the desire of some judges to attract
cases, 195 the threat of electoral challenge, and the proximity of the next
election. 196 Transparency

is

needed

to

prevent judges

from

acting

improperly.
D. COPYING LA wYms'

WORK PRODUCT

A substantial portion of all lawyers' work product is in the form of
documents filed with the courts. Those documents are entitled to little, if

192. Zemans, supra note 184, at 640.
193. Id.
194. In many parts of the United States, for example, lawyers recommend for or against the
retention of particular judges by publicly voting on them prior to the election. See, e.g., Lawyers
Strongly SupportJudge Who Approved Lesbian Divorce, ADVOCATE.COM, Sept. 23, 2004, http://www.
advocate.com/news-detail.asp?id=06629 (noting that the judge who granted an unpopular
divorce to two lesbians received a ninety-three percent approval rating in the Iowa State Bar
Association's election-year poll).
195. LoPucKi, supra note 46, at 137-80 (documenting the effect of court competition on
substantive decisionmaking).
196. Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death?Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-Capital Cases
Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 204-06 (2004) (reviewing the literature regarding the
effects that upcoming elections have on judicial modifications ofjury sentences).
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any, copyright protection. 9 7 Because the same problems and legal issues
recur, lawyers often copy the work of other lawyers. The principal
impediment to such copying is lawyers' difficulty in finding and evaluating
the most relevant documents. Today, court-document copying is generally
confined to the documents produced by other members of a lawyer's firm.
That is because the lawyer can find those documents by searching the firm's
archives, and because the firm's standard of quality generally assures the
particular document's quality.
In a transparent court system, a lawyer could search among all
documents filed with the courts. To the extent that the lawyer was familiar
with the standards of quality of the firms that produced the documents,
those standards would assure the documents' quality. In essence, the court
system would become the world's largest legal form book. Lawyers could
copy pleadings, motions, memoranda, briefs, and even the contracts that
frequently appear in the court files as attachments or evidence. The fact that
this "form book" would be free would tend to reduce lawyers' costs.
In addition, lawyers could use filed transcripts of depositions or
hearings in similar cases to prepare for depositions or hearings in their own
cases. For example, they could see the problems encountered by an earlier
lawyer in questioning a particular expert witness or a type of expert witness
and perhaps improve on the earlier lawyer's approach. They could see what
arguments were made when an earlier lawyer argued a particular issue
before a court and see from the court's decision how successful that
argument was. Thus, the principal effects of such copying would be to
improve the quality of legal services and reduce prices.
The principal problem with copying in other contexts-that it
discourages the production of originals-is not present in the legal context.
Clients pay for the production of originals, and lawyers are ethically
restrained from charging later clients for work already done. Thus,
transparency and copying would not significantly reduce the production of
originals.
The effect may, in fact, be to increase the production of originals. When
a single client cannot afford the entire cost of producing the original, the
client's lawyer could search the court system for other parties who need the
same documents and might be willing to share the cost. For example, the
client who loses on an issue and seeks to appeal could share the appeal's
cost with other clients whose cases would be affected by the appeal's
outcome.

197.
Davida H. Isaacs, The Highest Form of Flattery? Application of the Fair Use Defense Against
Copyright Claimsfor UnauthorizedAppropriationof Litigation Documents, 71 MO. L. REv. 391, 402-11
(2006) (observing that many complaints and memoranda may lack the requisite originality and

creativity necessary for copyright protection though some legal documents may contain
portions that deserve copyright protection).
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E.

FLIGHT TO PRIVATE ADJUDICATION

While litigation is generally public, arbitration is generally private. As
one commentator put it:
Most arbitrations are private. Privacy permeates the atmosphere of
arbitration and is often perceived by contracting parties as an
advantage over public litigation. In addition to the private location
of hearings, the results of arbitration are also private; published
opinions are rare. The typical arbitration concludes with a terse,
non-explanatory written award that is not disclosed to the public.
In short, most arbitration results are essentially secret.19 8
Under current law, parties have, in general, the right to choose between
99
arbitration and litigation by contract.
That competition between litigation and arbitration is not a healthy one
from the perspective of society as a whole. Public adjudication produces
public benefits; private arbitration does not. Because the parties that choose
between the two have no incentive to take the public benefits of public
adjudication into account, the result is a more-than-economically-optimal
amount of arbitration.
This has led some commentators to speculate that "increased
transparency in civil litigation may have wrought an unintended and
unwelcome consequence-the diversion of more civil disputes into
alternative dispute resolution proceedings like arbitration, where the public
is 'shut out of information almost completely.' 200 If that is true, the
increased transparency proposed in this Article would tend to divert even
more disputes to arbitration.
Numerous commentators have lamented arbitration's opacity20' and
proposed that the law require more transparency. 20 2 Some states have

198. Edward Bnmet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 84-85 (1992)
(citations omitted).
199. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable
except "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
200. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus PrivateJustice: It's Time to Let Some Sun Shine in
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 463, 465 (2006) (quotingJack B. Weinstein
& Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 20 (2001)). Evidence
exists to the contrary. Despite the fact that "[p]ublicity is the price a decedent pays for using
'court regulated devices' such as wills or testamentary trusts as opposed to a 'private
arrangement' such as a revocable trust," the tabloids suffer no shortage of wills of the rich and
famous. Foster, supra note 102, at 559. Despite the fact that substantially every bankruptcy file is
publicly available on PACER, more than 1.7 million Americans filed bankruptcy annually before
the recent "reforms." U.S. Bankr. Courts, Table F-2, http://vw.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/
bankrupt_f2table_.jun2006.xls (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (reporting on the twelve month
period that endedJune 30, 2006).
201. Jean R. Sternlight, CreepingMandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1658
(2005) ("Unfortunately, researchers have found it very difficult to evaluate mandatory
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already begun to address the problem. 20 3 The solution might be for the
courts to enforce only arbitration awards obtained in transparent
proceedings-on the principle that the government should not enforce the
decisions of secret tribunals. That would cause many more disputants to opt
for public adjudication.
Some people may choose to compromise their rights rather than suffer
the embarrassment of public adjudication. Undoubtedly, many already do.
In establishing public courts, the government already has determined that
those courts should hear disputes only if they rise to such a level of
importance that the litigants are willing to incur costs, go public, and suffer
some amount of discomfort.
Some types of disputes are highly embarrassing, but nevertheless
require government resolution. Public adjudication of those disputes might
not be appropriate. But the law already provides for the sealing of records
and the closing of trials and hearings in such cases. 204 In the transition from
the current system to a transparent system, some increase in the proportion
of sealed records and closed hearings and trials might be needed. 20 5 But the
existence of a small number of matters requiring privacy should not prevent
society from capturing the huge benefits of transparency in other matters.

arbitration, for a number of reasons. First, to a large extent, researchers cannot obtain access to
the data they need to perform good studies.... [O]ne of the fundamental traits of arbitration
is that it is typically private."); see also TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:

COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 81 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds.,
2005) ("Arbitration proceedings themselves are private and thus difficult to study. The nature
of the process adds to that difficulty. Much of what happens (such as with respect to discovery)
may not be documented in any central case file.").
202. See, e.g.,
Dor6, supra note 200, at 520 (advocating "[ilncreased transparency and
accessibility to at least some aspects of ADR in at least some cases"); Judith Resnik, Uncovering,
Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.KENT. L. REv. 521, 569 (2006) (applauding legislation and proposed legislation that requires
arbitrators of some kinds of disputes to provide reasons for their decisions and make them
available to the public).
203. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2007) (requiring arbitration providers
to publish data on arbitration outcomes).
204. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (specifying
conditions under which courts may close trials and hearings).
205. Evidence that no adjustment is needed also exists.
[lI]t is the experience of the ECF prototype courts and courts which have been
imaging documents and making them electronically available that reliance on
judicial discretion has not been problematic and has not dramatically increased or
altered the amount and nature of motions to seal. It is also the experience of those
courts that have been making their case file information available through
PACERNet that there have been virtually no reported privacy problems as a result.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PRIvACY REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.

COURT-SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The federal courts may soon begin requiring the use of data-enabled
PDF forms for some kinds of petitions, motions, and orders. Those forms
constitute a landmark advance in the potential for court-system transparency
because researchers can automatically extract data from them. They would
remove the last technological barrier to the complete automation of the
process of gathering, analyzing, and reporting basic court-system research.
Once data-enabled forms were in widespread use, government-imposed
fees would be the sole remaining barrier to automated transparency.
Eliminating those fees would open a real-time window on court-system
operation superior to any previously possible. Not only researchers, but
parties, lawyers, the government, and the public could see every important
aspect of how the courts operate.
The benefits would be tremendous. Policymakers, litigants, and the
public could see the amounts of damages granted in personal-injury cases,
the lengths of criminal sentences, the likelihood of success on various kinds
of motions, the differences in outcomes among courts, the relative
effectiveness of lawyers and expert witnesses, and the answers to a myriad of
other questions. Policymakers would have the feedback they need to
fundamentally improve or fine tune the system. Lawyers could predict the
outcomes of their cases. Legal planners could see what works and what does
not. The public would, for the first time, be able to see what courts actually
do and whether the precautions that members of the public are taking "for
legal reasons" are the right ones.
Initially, the wash of new knowledge would embarrass the legal system
and the people who run it. Judges and other court officials would find
themselves working in a goldfish bowl. Transparency would reveal huge
differences in outcomes based on factors that are not supposed to produce
any differences at all. Principal among those factors would be the identities
of the judges and lawyers. Although the U.S. legal system seems relatively
free of the crude kinds of corruption in which litigants bribe judges to
change outcomes, transparency might reveal that the system suffers from
other kinds of corruption: judges seeking to attract particular kinds of cases,
manifesting their ideologies, or favoring particular litigants for personal
gain.
Because transparency would shift power, entrenched interests can be
expected to oppose it. They will argue that transparency would be costly, but
in fact, private volunteers would bear nearly all of the cost. They will argue
that transparency would expose parties and witnesses to the threat of
identify theft and other harms. In fact, only a few pieces of information raise
that threat and transparency is the approach best calculated to remove those
pieces from the public record. Other threats to individuals can be addressed
through the courts' power to seal particular documents or portions of
documents, without sacrificing transparency's benefits. Transparency's
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opponents will argue that transparency would make previously difficult-toobtain public-record information about individuals more easily available.
That, however, is an advantage of transparency, not a drawback.
Lastly, they will argue that transparency would result in public pressures
on judges to decide cases differently. Some of those pressures are, however,
entirely appropriate. Transparency would aid in sorting the pressures that
are appropriate in a democracy from those that are not. It would provide the
public with the information the public needs to fulfill its oversight function
with respect to the courts.
Once the public could see the courts as they actually are, the political
pressure to reform them would be intense. Those advantaged under the
status quo would fight back with arguments for privacy and confidentiality.
But if American institutions are capable of reforming the courts to comply
with American ideals of transparency and justice, the human benefits may be
at a level unprecedented in history.

